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ABSTRACT
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS
Cinthia Konichi Paulo
Joseph Harrington
This dissertation consists of two self-contained chapters that explore intriguing properties
of procurement auctions. The first chapter empirically analyzes procurement auctions in
which suppliers must decide their bids based on expectations about how future market
conditions will affect their costs. While previous literature has focused on the uncertainty
about winning or losing the auction, I examine the risk that is intrinsic to the contract.
I use data from government procurement auctions in the State of Sao Paulo in Brazil for
fresh produce to study the effect of contract risk on auction outcomes. I find that suppliers
are risk averse and therefore include a risk premium in the prices they bid, which can reach
38% of the price for some goods. In addition, I show that a simple change in the payment
scheme, in which the government pays a fixed amount plus 40% of the reference index of
wholesale prices, could reduce the risk premium to less than 1% of the bid price for all
goods analyzed.
The second chapter analyzes the phenomenon of jump bidding, when a bidder places a bid
that is larger than necessary to outbid the current winning bid. Models that explain this
type of behavior say that jump bidding arise as a signaling strategy to communicate strength
to competitors. However, using a large dataset of procurement auctions that spans across
different industries, the predictions of those models do not match the patterns observed in
the data. I find that winners place smaller jumps on average, which contradicts the signaling
strategy and suggests that jumps might not be monotonic in the bidders’ valuations.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
CHAPTER 1 : Bidding When Cost Is Uncertain: Evidence From Fresh Produce
Procurement Auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Institutional Background and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Model of Bidding Behavior with Unknown Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.5 Counterfactual Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.6 Conclusion and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
CHAPTER 2 : Economic Insights From Bidding Behavior In Procurement Auctions:
Jump Bidding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.2 Institutional Background and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.3 Jump bidding in the data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.4 Jump bidding as a signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.5 Some Intriguing Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
vi
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
vii
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE 1 : Summary Statistics for Wholesale prices, Winning Bid, and Contract
Characteristics: 2008-2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
TABLE 2 : Summary Statistics for Prices Received By Farmers, Wholesale Prices
and Winning Bid: 2008-2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
TABLE 3 : ARMA-GARCH Models for the Wholesale Prices Series . . . . . . 37
TABLE 4 : Correlation Between Forecasts and Actual Series . . . . . . . . . . 37
TABLE 5 : Estimated Risk Aversion - Fruits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
TABLE 6 : Contract Value and Implied Coefficient on Relative Risk Aversion 39
TABLE 7 : Implied Risk Premium: Percentage of Winning Bid . . . . . . . . 40
TABLE 8 : Bidder-Good Estimated Fixed Effects Correlation . . . . . . . . . 40
TABLE 9 : Estimated Risk Aversion - Root Vegetables . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
TABLE 10 : Estimated Risk Aversion: All Suppliers Except Winners . . . . . . 42
TABLE 11 : Estimated Risk Aversion: All suppliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
TABLE 12 : Procurement Auctions: 2008-2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
TABLE 13 : Summary Statistics: Auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
TABLE 14 : Summary Statistics: Bidders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
TABLE 15 : Summary Statistics: Buyers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
TABLE 16 : Jump Bidding Summary Statistics: Auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
TABLE 17 : Jump Bidding Summary Statistics: Bidders . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
TABLE 18 : Jump Bidding Summary Statistics: Buyers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
TABLE 19 : Number of Bids and Jumps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
TABLE 20 : The Effect of Jump Bidding on the Number of Bids . . . . . . . . 75
TABLE 21 : Number of Bids After First Jump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
TABLE 22 : Price Fall and Jumps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
viii
TABLE 23 : Bid Order of First Jump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
TABLE 24 : Jump size according to ranking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
TABLE 25 : The Effect of the Number of Bidders on Average Jump Size . . . . 82
TABLE 26 : The Effect of Firm’s and Auction’s Traits on Average Jump Size per
Bidder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
TABLE 27 : Winner’s Aggressiveness and Outcome of Procurement Process . . 84
TABLE 28 : Jumps and Outcome of Procurement Process . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
TABLE 29 : Jumps and Outcome of Procurement Process: Censored Regression 85
TABLE 30 : Jumps and Likelihood of Trade: Logit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
TABLE 31 : Jumps and Price Fall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
ix
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
FIGURE 1 : Contract Risk Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
FIGURE 2 : Goods that Cannot be Accepted Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
FIGURE 3 : Banana Wholesale Prices Volatility: 2005-2014 . . . . . . . . . . . 32
FIGURE 4 : Lime Wholesale Prices Volatility: 2005-2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
FIGURE 5 : Orange Wholesale Prices Volatility: 2005-2014 . . . . . . . . . . . 34
FIGURE 6 : Tomato (green) Wholesale Prices Volatility: 2005-2014 . . . . . . 35
FIGURE 7 : Tomato (ripe) Wholesale Prices Volatility: 2005-2014 . . . . . . . 36
FIGURE 8 : Mean Expected Prices and Bids: 2008-2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
FIGURE 9 : Risk Premium for Different Fractions of Risk Sharing: Banana . . 44
FIGURE 10 : Risk Premium for Different Fractions of Risk Sharing: Lime . . . 45
FIGURE 11 : Risk Premium for Different Fractions of Risk Sharing: Orange . . 46
FIGURE 12 : Risk Premium for Different Fractions of Risk Sharing: Tomato (ripe) 47
FIGURE 13 : Risk Premium for Different Fractions of Risk Sharing: Tomato
(green) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
FIGURE 14 : Savings with respect to the winning bid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
FIGURE 15 : Distribution of Jump Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
FIGURE 16 : Distribution of Jump Sizes 0-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
FIGURE 17 : Contract Price and Minimum Bid Requirement . . . . . . . . . . 72
FIGURE 18 : Average Number of Bids Per Good in Auction With and Without
Jumps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
FIGURE 19 : Average Jump Size per Minute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
FIGURE 20 : Average Jump Size per Bid Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
FIGURE 21 : Average Number of Jumps per Duration Decile . . . . . . . . . . 79
FIGURE 22 : Distribution of Coefficients on Jump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
x
FIGURE 23 : Average Number of Bids Per Good in Auction With and Without
Jumps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
xi
CHAPTER 1 : Bidding When Cost Is Uncertain: Evidence From Fresh Produce
Procurement Auctions
1.1. Introduction
A recurring concern for economists and policymakers is how to improve the efficiency of
public sector spending. Procurement auctions are a common mechanism for governments to
buy goods and services. Examples of procurement auctions abound and range from highway
construction, the distribution of school milk and utility services procurement, to mention
some of the most common. Therefore, understanding how the auction process affects the
price the government ultimately pays is of first order importance.
A key feature of many government auctions is that the execution of the service commissioned
spans a long period of time. These prolonged commitments introduce uncertainty in the
suppliers’ costs. Because suppliers are uncertain about how market conditions will evolve
throughout the length of the contract, and how these changes will affect their costs, they
must account for this risk in their bids. Intuitively, if suppliers expect higher costs in the
future, their bids should reflect those predictions.
The aim of this paper is to empirically analyze how this uncertainty affects suppliers’ bids,
which ultimately affects the government’s cost of procurement. While there is a plethora
of research on risk in auctions, most of it refers to whether suppliers are going to win the
auction. As such, the ex post risk that is intrinsic to contracts has largely been overlooked
in the literature. Given that such long-term contracts are quite common, empirical evidence
on how suppliers incorporate uncertainty into their bids has many important applications.
To address this issue, I study procurement auctions for fresh produce in the State of Sao
Paulo in Brazil. The State government buys a wide range of produce in large quantities
to be delivered in many installments during the contract length. Suppliers are committed
to the price they offered in the auction and take into account how input prices will evolve
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during the length of the contract to better estimate the cost of supplying the good. In those
instances, regardless of winning the auction or not, suppliers must base their bids on the
distribution of future costs.
There are many features that make this setting particularly appealing. Not only is fresh
produce a perishable commodity, but prices are subject to exogenous variations in weather.1
This latter issue, besides usual seasonality, is always a source of uncertainty. Depending on
the time of year and length of contract, buying a large amount of fresh produce in advance
can be more or less risky. Moreover, because these are commodity goods, wholesale market
prices provide a natural measure to evaluate the risk in each contract.
Committing to a price for an extended period of time for a good that cannot be stored can
be very risky. Figure 1 provides an example of the contract risk suppliers face. It plots
the wholesale prices for ripe tomatoes, the duration of two contracts and their respective
winning bids. In the first contract, in mid-2012, the winning bid adjusted for inflation was
R$1.57.2 The auction winner won the right to supply the good for three months and during
the contract duration the wholesale price increased, reaching up to R$4, and the average
wholesale price during that period was R$2.83. In contrast, the second contract in Figure
1 in mid-2013 goes in the opposite direction. The winning bid adjusted for inflation was
R$2.82. A few weeks into the duration of the contract, wholesale prices started a sharp
decrease and the average for the four months in which the supplier delivered the good was
R$1.91. In this case, it is safe to assume that the contract was profitable for the supplier.
These cases illustrate that the main uncertainty suppliers face is the cost of buying the
goods. Thus, a key feature in my empirical approach is to include market forecasts about
future fluctuations in a supplier’s cost function. The intuition behind this approach is
1Moschini and Hennessy (2001) points out four main sources of uncertainty in agricultural production:
production uncertainty, that is related to uncontrollable variables such as weather; price uncertainty, related
to the biological production lag between production decision and output; technological uncertainty, which
may turn past investments obsolete; and policy uncertainty, since the agricultural sector is often subject of
government interventions.
2R$ stands for the Brazilian currency (Brazilian Real).
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that in order to maximize expected utility, suppliers must make projections about future
market prices. I assume they base these projections on two sets of public information: past
wholesale market prices and weather conditions in the largest production region for each of
the goods I am studying. I explore the volatility in the wholesale market prices and use a
standard time series approach to model the price series and make forecasts for the duration
of the contract. With those forecasts, I am able to measure the risk of each contract.
Using the bidding equilibrium in a second price auction and variations in the contract risk,
I uncover cost parameters relative to the contract risk as well as risk preference parameter.
I estimate the coefficient on risk aversion for CARA utility bidders and find that suppliers
are significantly risk averse. This aversion translates to a risk premium in the prices they
bid, which can reach 38% of the price the government pays for some goods. This evidence
suggests that the procurement cost can be substantially higher for goods for which market
conditions are less stable. In addition, I show that a simple change in the payment scheme,
in which the government pays a fixed amount plus 40% of the reference index of wholesale
prices, could reduce the risk premium to less than 1% of the bid price for all goods analyzed.
In this exercise, the government would be able to save more than 18% of the total amount
spent had it used this different payment scheme.
To verify if the results hold under different specifications, I run three additional tests. First,
because the main interest of the paper is on how much the government actually pays, the
main analysis focuses on winning bids only. To determine whether results also hold for all
other bids, I include other bids besides the winning bid. Second, the main analysis focuses
on suppliers that participate regularly in the auctions. To test if results are not being driven
by those frequent suppliers, I also include bidders that participated in fewer auctions. The
results in both tests confirm that suppliers are risk averse and therefore include a risk
premium in the price they bid. Third, I provide an additional test to determine whether
bidding behavior is driven by risk preferences by performing the same analysis for root
vegetables. Root vegetables present a stark contrast with fruits because they usually last
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longer and are easier to store. As such, the risk of buying these types of goods should
be much lower because suppliers can buy when prices are lower and store until delivery.
Indeed, I find that for these types of goods, suppliers bid as if they are risk neutral.
Unlike the most common approach in the literature, in which the uncertainty suppliers face
refers to whether they are going to win the auction, I examine the risk that is intrinsic
to the contract. As mentioned earlier, the prevalence of this type of ex post risk in real
world auctions is ubiquitous, although it has received little attention in the literature.
Here, however, there are two notable exceptions. The first is Bajari et al. (2014), which
study highway procurement auctions in California.3 In their setting, suppliers anticipate
how actual quantities will differ from estimated ones and include adaptation costs in their
bids. When the difference is substantial, suppliers and government procurers renegotiate
compensation around those differences. In my setting suppliers are committed to the price
they bid. Similar to my results, they find that uncertainty carries a premium. In their
case, they found that adaptation costs can increase the cost of procurement for highways
construction up to 14%.
The second paper (Haile (2001)) studies the effects of resale opportunities in bidders’ val-
uations in timber auctions. Haile (2001) finds evidence that bidders’ valuations are higher
when the value of selling in the resale market is higher. In his setting, bidders infer how
valuable resale opportunities will be in the future from the number of participants in the
auction. While both Bajari et al. (2014) and Haile (2001) address uncertainty about the
contract value, they assume that bidders are risk neutral. In this paper, I estimate the
presence and significance of expectations about input prices fluctuations in the winning bid
and estimate suppliers’ risk preferences.
Indeed, most of the studies on auctions rely on the assumption that bidders are risk neutral,
3On the theoretical side, Esö and White (2004) study contract risk in auctions and find that in a in-
terdependent values auction and random ex post risk, CARA bidders require an amount equal to the risk
premium to compensate the marginal utility of income for an increase in risk.
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but there have been efforts to test this hypothesis when uncertainty refers to the odds
of winning the auction. In ascending bid auctions, the bidding strategy is the same for
risk neutral and risk averse bidders. Therefore, risk preferences cannot be identified by
observing bids only (Athey and Haile (2007)). Because of this difficulty, most of the papers
that estimate risk preferences focus on first-price sealed-bid auctions (Bajari and Hortasu
(2005), Lu and Perrigne (2008), Campo et al. (2011), Campo (2012) among others). More
recently though, Fang and Tang (2014) and Li et al. (2015) use entry behavior to construct
tests for risk attitudes in ascending bid auctions.
My study contributes to several streams of research in the literature. First, risk preferences
and decision-making under uncertainty are two essential features of agriculture produc-
tion and many authors have studied farmers’ attitudes towards risk.4 The range of risk
aversion estimates in this strand of literature is very wide, but one pattern seems to be
consistent: farmers in developing countries are more risk averse than their counterparts in
developed countries. And because most of the studies do not control for the availability of
risk-management instruments, the difference can be even greater (Young (1979)). This is
consistent with my finding of a high degree of risk aversion among suppliers. Although they
are intermediaries (not farmers), suppliers in my data are working in a developing country
known for weak institutions and lack of credit access.
Second, my findings relate to a large empirical literature that is broadly concerned with the
reduction of government spending in procurement auctions. A very common concern when
studying the cost of procurement is the possibility of collusion. Two classic references in this
literature are Porter and Zona (1993) and Porter and Zona (1999), which are based on pre-
existing suspicions on bid rigging activity. However, the market for fresh produce is very
competitive and the online procurement process is transparent (which makes corruption
difficult). Besides that, there has been no suggestion of irregular activity in these auctions,
which would make any exercise to try to find evidence of collusion impractical (Harrington
4For a survey on risk attitudes in agricultural production, see Moschini and Hennessy (2001).
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(2008)). Finally, another branch of the literature considers the effect of entry in procurement
auctions (see, for example, Li and Zheng (2009) and Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011)).
Because entry costs are negligible in the auctions I am studying, I take participation as
exogenous.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides institutional back-
ground on the online procurement process and introduces the data. Section 3 presents the
model of bidding behavior when costs are uncertain. Section 4 outlines the empirical strat-
egy and presents the main estimates of the size of risk premia paid by the government. A
counterfactual involving risk-sharing with the government is conducted in Section 5. Section
6 concludes.
1.2. Institutional Background and Data
In this section, I describe the procurement process and the data. The two most important
components of my empirical approach are the equilibrium bid strategy in a second-price
auction and the measure of contract risk. I will input the contract risk in the suppliers’
cost function and use the result that suppliers bid truthfully to uncover the cost and risk
preference parameters.
Three main data sources are used to execute this empirical strategy. The first dataset
is new to the literature and consists of the reports of the procurement auctions that are
publicly available online.5,6 Since 2008, the State of Sao Paulo in Brazil has bought a wide
range of goods and services through electronic procurement auctions combined with post-
auction bargaining. The State is the most populated Brazilian state and produces almost
one third of the country’s GDP, which makes it an important local economy.7 Although I
5Ferraz et al. (2015) also use Brazilian procurement auctions but their study is about Federal government
purchases.
6All the reports and auction details can be found at http://www.bec.sp.gov.br (in Portuguese).
7During the period studied (2008-2014), there were two administrations with governors elected from the
same political party so there is no concern about radical political changes. There were three governors during
this period. The first one was elected and began his mandate in 2007 but renounced to run for president
and the vice-governor assumed. The third one was elected and began his mandate in 2011.
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have all the auctions from 2008 to 2014, I focus the description on the fresh produce items
commissioned, which are the main interest of this study.
The procurement process has three main stages. The government agency first publicly an-
nounces the auction and describes the goods it wants to buy. In the case of fresh produce,
the description is very detailed, including width or length ranges that are acceptable, overall
quality (cleanliness, ripeness, firmness of flesh, no damage, etc.) and transportation condi-
tion requirements. If the good delivered does not meet the requirements, the government
agency may reject the delivery and require another delivery or terminate the contract, in
which case the firm is subject to penalties. The public announcement also specifies the
total quantity being commissioned, the length of the contract and the schedule of deliver-
ies.8 Moreover, it describes the day and time the auction will take place and the minimum
increment between bids required.
Prospective suppliers submit initial offers before the auction takes place to indicate interest
in participating in the procurement process. On the auction day, the number of interested
and qualified bidders are revealed and the second stage is the auction itself that follows
a reverse English auction protocol.9 Each supplier is given a random identifying name so
identities are not known to the agency and other bidders, but all bids and identifiers are
observed. The bidding stage lasts for 15 minutes, unless there is a valid bid in the last
three minutes.10 In such cases, the bidding phase is extended for three more minutes and
continues until there are no more valid bids. The winner is the one who submitted the
lowest bid.11
8Most of the contracts have a well defined schedule for deliveries, but the amount of each installment can
be defined “as needed until the completion of the total quantity”. Nevertheless, the public announcement
always provides an expected time frame for the duration of the contract.
9Initial offers may not qualify in case there is any kind of information in the document submitted with
the proposal that identifies the supplier. For instance, the government provides instructions in order to hide
the firm name from Microsoft Office and Acrobat Reader products.
10A valid bid is any bid that is lower than the supplier’s last bid and satisfies the minimum difference
between bids required in the public announcement.
11There is one exception to this rule. In case a firm is classified as a small firm (depending on gross
revenue) and its bid is very close to the winning bid (usually no more than 5% higher), this firm is given
preference. For an analysis of preference programs in procurement auctions, see Krasnokutskaya and Seim
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The last stage is a bargaining phase where the auctioneer bargains with the winner of the
auction stage. In principle the bargaining stage adds a challenge to my empirical strategy
because, when choosing their bids, suppliers anticipate the bargaining stage and might
shade their reservation price. However, for the case of fresh produce, the final price for
more than 82% of the auctions is equal to the winning bid, meaning that there were no
further reductions in the price in the bargaining stage.12 Moreover, for this particular set of
goods, differences between each bid are very small (the median is R$ 0.02) and jump bids
are rare.13 Indeed, around 80% of all differences between bids are equal to the minimal bid
requirement, which is almost always less than R$0.05. Larsen (2014) makes similar points
to argue that the auction in his setting is similar to a button auction, which is a general
framework to describe English auctions, in which prices decrease continuously and bidders
hold a button to indicate interest. When a bidder decides to release the button, the price at
which he/she exited is his/her bid. Furthermore, Larsen (2014) shows that if the auction is
a button auction, the bargaining stage does not affect the bidding strategies in the auction
stage.
The assumption that the auction in my setting is a button auction is important in the
empirical analysis as it allows me to identify the bidding strategy. In this type of auction,
bidders bid truthfully, that is, they exit the auction at their true valuation. When there
are only two bidders left and one leaves the auction, the price at which he/she exited is
the winning bid and is equal to his/her valuation. Therefore, the winning bid will be the
second-order statistic from the distribution of costs. From this result, I can determine how
the winning bid will be related to the second-lowest bidder cost. Hence, from now I will
focus the analysis on the second-lowest bidder cost and the winning bid in each auction.
(2011). The setting I am studying is slightly different from theirs though, since the supplier must be able
to contract at least at the price the lowest bidder submitted and entry costs are negligible.
12Even when there was bargaining, it does not necessarily mean that there was a reduction in price.
It could be the case that the winner was disqualified for some reason and the government bought from
(bargained with) the second-lowest bidder.
13Jump bid happens when bidders place a bid that is larger than necessary to be the current winning
bidder. For a model that rationalizes this kind of behavior, see Avery (1998).
8
The other important aspect of my empirical approach is how to construct a measure of the
risk in each contract. The risk suppliers face in my setting refers to how much the good will
cost when the time comes to deliver it. I will assume that suppliers make forecasts about
future fluctuations in prices, taking into account past prices and weather conditions in the
largest production regions for each of the goods. The following datasets are used with that
objective in mind. I will use a series of wholesale prices for fresh produce since 2005 and
also collect weather variables from the main production regions for each good that I am
analyzing.
The wholesale prices data for fresh produce is a daily series from Ceagesp, the most impor-
tant market for produce in the State. The prices collected by Ceagesp are an important
part in calculating price indexes. In fact, the online auction system requires suppliers to
specify the brand of the good they are selling when submitting initial offers. Because brand
is not clearly defined for fresh produce, many of the suppliers list Ceagesp as a brand, which
seems to be strong evidence that they are actually buying the goods from this market. The
description of the goods in the Ceagesp wholesale prices series match satisfactorily well the
description in the auction dataset.14 Prices since 2005 for all goods are available from the
Ceagesp website.15
Finally, I also collected information from all weather stations in the country from the Na-
tional Institute of Meteorology (INMET) to include weather changes in the forecasts. From
each weather station, I collected daily amounts of rain, hours of sun exposure, average tem-
perature and relative humidity. From these variables, I compute the average per day and
State. Then, I construct a moving average of the past 15 and 30 days and compute squares,
lags and interactions using these moving averages. Lastly, to determine which States are
the largest producers of each good in the country, I complement this dataset with a re-
14Ceagesp has a program called Hortiescolha that helps government agencies describe in a very precise
way the goods they want to buy. Therefore, it is very likely that the description in the auction public
announcements is actually inspired by the Ceagesp’s descriptions to make it easier to reference to.
15http://www.ceagesp.gov.br (in Portuguese).
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port from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), which contains crops
production information by city.16 The motivation for this strategy is the intuition that if
weather changes affect the production in the largest producer State, then it will likely have
an effect on prices nationwide.
For those goods that I have data on 1) auctions, 2) wholesale prices and 3) production, I use
the five that were most frequently bought through the auctions and are not root vegetables,
which are: bananas, ripe tomatoes, green (unripened) tomatoes, large oranges and limes.
The motivation for looking at fruits as opposed to root vegetables, such as potatos, carrots,
onions and garlic, is that root vegetables last longer on average and are easier to store.
Because my main interest is in estimating the risk premium when contracts are risky, these
two features of root vegetables make them less attractive for the analysis.17,18
Table 1 provides summary statistics about each good. The contract price the government
pays is on average lower than the wholesale price. The quantity varies substantially and
the contracts last for 3.5 months on average. In total, there are 5,983 auctions for these
goods. From 2008 to 2014, the most frequently purchased product are bananas with 1,742
auctions, and the least frequently purchased product are limes, with 519 auctions. The
goods were purchased by 137 different government agencies, most of them (around 90%)
are penitentiaries. During this period, the government bought around US$8 m of these
goods.
The most striking feature of Table 1 is the large difference between the winning bid and
wholesale market prices. One possible explanation is that the government buys very large
quantities, so volume discounts might be present. Consistent with that explanation is that
limes have the smallest volume and winning bids are closer to wholesale prices than any
16I used the most recent report, from 2013.
17Root vegetables refer to any vegetable that grows under earth and it may include bulbs (onion, garlic),
modified plant stem (potatoes) and true roots (yuca).
18For reference on how long some fruits and vegetables can be stored, see
http://www.gardening.cornell.edu/factsheets/vegetables/storage.pdf
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other good. Another possible explanation is that Table 1 presents means for the period and
therefore does not take into account that suppliers decide their bids based on beliefs about
future prices.
Furthermore, a very reasonable explanation is that suppliers buy goods directly from farmers
below wholesale prices. Table 2 shows the prices received by farmers for bananas, oranges
and tomatoes collected by the Agricultural Economics Institute in the State of Sao Paulo
(IEA).19 Winning bids are in between the prices received by farmers and the wholesale
market prices, which makes it clear that suppliers have margins to work with when bidding
on the contracts with the government. Although the farmers’ prices are a natural measure
of input prices suppliers face, the description is not as precise as in the wholesale market
price series and prices are aggregated.20 Therefore, in the main analysis I will use the
wholesale market price series as a proxy for the input prices paid by the suppliers, as it
captures the fluctuations in the input cost.
Finally, a plausible concern that arises when looking at the differences between wholesale
prices and winning bids is whether the government agencies are getting lower-quality prod-
ucts. Informal interviews with some suppliers resulted in ambiguous reports: while some
did say that they might mix goods of different quality, others said that the agencies’ re-
quirements are very strict, therefore goods’ quality is well above average. A program called
“Hortiescolha” sponsored by Ceagesp aims to help agencies to get high-quality products.
One way they help is to provide these agencies with a very precise description of each good
in terms of size, weight, and transportation conditions, among other characteristics. All the
descriptions are easily found on their website.21 Moreover, the program instructs agency
staff on what cannot be received by providing pictures of poor-quality goods. Figure 2
shows an example for oranges and ripe tomatoes. Therefore, while I cannot know if the
19Unfortunately, prices for limes were not available.
20For instance, in the wholesale market price series I find the price for “large oranges of variety pera”
which is the same good I find in the auctions data, while in the farmers’ price series the good is defined just
as “oranges”. Moreover, the data contains only monthly averages and not daily prices for some of the goods.
21http:// www.hortiescolha.com.br (in Portuguese).
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government is receiving lower-quality goods, it is certainly working to receive high-quality
products.22
With respect to suppliers, I considered those who bid in at least 30 auctions and on two
different goods, leaving 47 different suppliers that were ranked second-lowest bidder in any
auction. Almost all of the firms (44) bid in all five goods I am analyzing. On average, these
firms participated in 1,563 online procurement auctions in total and in 127 auctions for the
five goods that I am studying. Although I am focusing on the auctions where the suppliers
were ranked second, it is worth mentioning that on average they won 33% of the auctions
that they participated in for these goods. The average distance from the supplier to the
buying agency is 118 km (73 miles), which translates to about an hour and 30 minutes one
way drive.23
More than 80% of the firms (38 out of 47) are small firms, as defined by their annual gross
revenue.24 They have been operating for 12 years on average, although two of them are
out of business according to their records in the Brazilian IRS. For reference, the country’s
average is 10.1 years of operation and about 50% of firms close their business after three
years.25
It is important to emphasize that the firms that participate in the auctions for fresh produce
are intermediaries, as they classify themselves as being either produce wholesalers or grocery
stores.26 That means that they are not producing the goods themselves, rather they buy
from farmers and sell to the public/firms/government. Their ownership structure is either
22Lewis-Faupel et al. (2014) study the effect of the introduction of electronic procurement auctions on
prices and quality in India and Indonesia for road constructions and public work projects, respectfully. They
find that although prices paid by the government do not seem to be different, quality has improved.
23Distances and travel times were computed using Google Maps and actual roads (not minimum distance
from one point to another) during no rush hours.
24To be considered a small firm, the firm’s annual gross revenue does not exceed R$3.6 m (approximately
US$1.1 m).
25According to the most recent report (2012) on firms demograph-
ics from the Brazilian Institute of of Geography and Statistics (IBGE):
http://ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/economia/demografiaempresa/2012/default.shtm (in Portuguese).
26For the two firms that closed their business, I could not find their economic activity in the Brazilian
IRS records. But I believe it is safe to assume that they belong to the same activity as the other firms.
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limited liability partnership (30 out of 47) or sole proprietorship. In the case of LLP, I
do not know from the data who - for example, business owner or employer - is bidding in
the auction. This could make a difference in terms of risk behavior and incentive schemes.
Because I am unable to identify the person who is placing the bid, I am assuming that
his/her objective is aligned with the owner to maximize profits.
In sum, the majority of firms are small and they have participated in many auctions. Ferraz
et al. (2015) study Brazilian procurement auctions commissioned by the Federal government.
In their study, they have a much larger set of suppliers, which may include the firms I am
analyzing. They found that winning a contract with the government boosts firm growth
and that this effect lasts beyond the length of the contract. Their result provides evidence
that contracts with government agencies are important for the suppliers to increase firm
growth.
Throughout the paper, I use and report monetary amounts in Brazilian Real (R$). Cumula-
tive inflation over the years I am studying (2008-2014) was 55%, as measured by the Broad
National Consumer Price Index (IPCA). To make prices comparable among the years, I
deflated all bids and wholesale prices to 2005 prices using IPCA. Because the unit of ob-
servation is my data is days, from the monthly inflation rate I computed the daily inflation
rate using the number of business days in each month-year.27
1.3. Model of Bidding Behavior with Unknown Costs
This section presents a model of firms’ profit function and bidding strategy that takes into
account expectations about market conditions. I will assume that each supplier i has CARA
utility of the form
Uijt
((
pijt − cijt′
)
qjt′
)
=
−e−α((pijt−cijt′)qjt′)
α
27Let r be the inflation rate in a specific month. The cumulative daily inflation was computed as it =
(1 + r
100
)1/d · it−1 where d is the number of business days in that month.
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where pijt is the price the government pays for good j in case supplier i wins the auction,
cijt′
(
qjt′
)
is the cost at t′, the time the good is delivered, qjt′ is the total quantity com-
missioned by the government, and α is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.28 CARA
utility function may be a strict assumption. Nonetheless, it is not only very tractable and
straightforward, but is also a benchmark utility function that has been widely used (see
Lapan and Moschini (1994) for an example that studies agricultural production and Easley
and O’hara (2004) for an example in Finance). More importantly, CARA focuses on ab-
solute risk aversion, which allows me to measure the curvature of the utility function at a
particular wealth level, abstaining from the recent discussion about the empirical relevance
of expected utility theory (Rabin (2000)).29
The important thing to note is that the cost cijt′ is unknown at the day of the auction t
because the good has yet to be purchased.30 I assume it has mainly two components: the
part of the cost that is specific to the firm and the part that is common to all bidders. The
latter is common to all firms participating in the auction. More formally:
cijt′ = φij + β1dit + β2Xt + γjZjt′ + εijt (1.1)
where φij are firm-good fixed effects, dit is the distance from the supplier to the agency
buying the good, Xt are the auction/contract’s observable characteristics (number of bidders
competing in the auction and total quantity being commissioned) and εijt is the part of the
firm’s cost that is unobserved to the econometrician but it is known to the firm at time t.31
28Henceforth, I will abbreviate cijt′ (qjt′) by cijt′ .
29This point is also raised in Cohen and Einav (2007).
30Papers that study bidders’ participation decision such as Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011) and Fang
and Tang (2014) assume that bidders do not know their cost when deciding to participate or not, but learn
it before the auction day. In my setting, suppliers learn the cost only after the bidding takes place. Besides
having to be pre-registered in the government potential suppliers database, which requires some document
preparation regarding tax compliance among other requirements but no fee, once the bidders are registered,
they can participate in any procurement auction. Essentially, there are no entry costs besides a one time
document preparation requirement that is not specific to the good being commissioned. Therefore, I am not
looking at entry decisions.
31Because I am not modeling the distribution of costs among suppliers, including the number of bidders in
the cost function is a way to control for changes in the underlying distribution when the number of bidders
change.
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The fixed effects φij aim to account for any time-independent variable, such as the firm’s
size and productivity, that may affect the costs, as well as storage infrastructure and the
presence or absence of long-term contracts with farmers.
Finally, Zjt′ is a measure of product j’s cost that is not known to the firm on the day of
the auction. This variable represents the uncertainty suppliers face about their own cost
since they do not know the price of the good on the day they are supposed to deliver it. As
such, we can interpret it as proxy for the suppliers’ opportunity cost. Therefore, different
from the auction theory literature, the bidders’ own cost or valuation is unknown.
Consequently, suppliers must make conjectures about Zjt′ in order to compute their ex-
pected profit. I am assuming they make their inferences based on two sets of information:
one that is private and includes {φij , εijt, dit}, which I denote by Wijt, and a set of public
information, denoted by It, that not only includes the auction/contract characteristics Xt,
but also any other information that is relevant in order to make forecasts about future price
fluctuations, like past prices and weather variables.
Suppose Zjt′ is normally distributed. Then cijt′ is normally distributed with mean µijt′ and
variance σ2ijt′ , which are given by
µijt′ = Et
[
cijt′
∣∣Wijt, It] = φij + β1dit + β2Xt + γjEt [Zjt′∣∣Wijt, It]+ εijt
σ2ijt′ = Vt
[
cijt′
∣∣Wijt, It] = γ2j Vt [Zjt′∣∣Wijt, It]
Therefore, the expected profits are given by32
Et
[
Uijt
((
pijt − cijt′
)
qjt′
)∣∣Wijt, It] = −e−α
((
pijt−µijt′−
1
2
αqjt′σ
2
ijt′
)
qjt′
)
α
Furthermore, I am assuming that, in order to make forecasts about future prices, all suppli-
32See Appendix for the derivation of this result.
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ers have the same set of information It and that inference about future price and volatility
are independent of Wit, that is, Et
[
Zjt′
∣∣Wijt, It] = Et [Zjt′∣∣ It] and Vt [Zjt′∣∣Wijt, It] =
Vt
[
Zjt′
∣∣ It]. Essentially, this hypothesis means that suppliers use the same forecasts to
compute their expected costs. Since the series of past prices and weather information are
publicly available and suppliers are small compared to market size, these forecasts could be
interpreted as market expectations. From now on, because the forecast for the variance of
the price does not depend on any variable that is i-dependent, I will omit the subscript i
from σ2ijt′ .
Note that although forecasts are a “common” factor in each supplier’s cost, those are public
signals that are the same for each supplier. Therefore, this is not a common values auctions
setting since the other suppliers’ costs are not relevant to determining supplier i’s own cost
(Athey and Haile (2007)), but it certainly adds correlation between valuations.
Finally, the rationale for choosing a bid will be that supplier i places bid pijt as long as the
price the government pays exceeds its reservation price, that is
pijt ≥ µijt′ +
1
2
αqjt′σ
2
jt′ (1.2)
As argued in Section 2, there are compelling reasons to assume that the online procurement
auction is well-approximated by a button auction framework: increments are very small
(the median is R$ 0.02) and jump bids are rare (see Larsen (2014)). This means that the
equilibrium bid strategy is to bid the true cost which implies Equation (1.2) holds with
equality for the last bid placed by each bidder that did not win the auction. This means
that the winning bid will be the second-order statistic from the distribution of (expected)
costs.
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Therefore, (1.2) becomes
p
(1)
ijt = φ
(2)
ij + β1d
(2)
it + β2Xt + γjEt
[
Zjt′
∣∣ It]+ 1
2
αγ2j qjt′Vt
[
Zjt′
∣∣ It]+ ε(2)ijt (1.3)
Equation (1.3) is the main regression equation. On the left side there is the bid placed by
the winner p1ijt and on the right side there are variables that are observable and unobservable
characteristics of the second-lowest bidder
(
φ2ij , d
2
it, ε
2
ijt
)
, auction characteristics
(
Xt, qjt′
)
and the forecasts Et
[
Zjt′
∣∣ It] and Vt [Zjt′∣∣ It]. Identification of the parameter α comes
from variation in the risk for each contract: the forecast Vt
[
Zjt′
∣∣ It] is different for each
good, auction day and contract length.
The main interest is to estimate how much risk the suppliers bear, that is, the risk premium
included in their bid as given by
Risk premium =
1
2
αγ2j qjt′Vt
[
Zjt′
∣∣ It] (1.4)
Note that in case I cannot reject that α, the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, is equal
to zero, we are back to the usual setting of risk neutrality and the risk premium is equal to
zero.
1.4. Empirical Analysis
This section presents the main estimates of the coefficient on risk aversion and implied
risk premium when contracts are risky. I first show how the forecasts Et
[
Zjt′
∣∣ It] and
Vt
[
Zjt′
∣∣ It] were computed using time series analysis in which I explore the volatility in the
series. Then, I present the main analysis that uses the forecasts as explanatory variables
for the bids suppliers place. The estimated parameters imply that suppliers are risk averse
and that the risk premium can be substantial when market conditions are volatile.
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1.4.1. Wholesale price forecasts
Figures 3-7 plot the complete series of wholesale prices for the five goods I am studying. The
continuous line in the top panel is a cubic spline fit for better visualization of the changes
in the series. The bottom panel in each figure shows the daily percentage change in prices.
The series presents a common phenomenon in financial data, which is the fact that there
are periods in which the volatility is high followed by some periods where the prices are
relatively stable.
Motivated by exploring the volatility as a measure of the risks suppliers face, in order to
compute the forecasts Et
[
Zjt′
∣∣ It] and Vt [Zjt′∣∣ It], I model each series as ARMA(p, q)-
GARCH(1, 1) model using standard time series techniques, where p is the number of au-
toregressive lags and q is the number of moving average lags. Formally, the ARMA(p, q)-
GARCH(1, 1) model is formulated as:
yt = c+ η1yt−1 + · · ·+ ηpyt−p + ut + θ1ut−1 + · · ·+ θqut−q
ut =
√
ht · νt
ht = ζ + α1u
2
t−1
where νt is i.i.d with mean zero and variance equal to 1.
33
For each good, I used the complete series (since 2005) to find the best fit using Akaike and
Schwarz information criteria.34 Table 3 presents the models chosen for each of the goods
using these criteria.
33For an introduction to ARMA-GARCH models, see Hamilton (1994).
34The information criteria are statistical measures that assess the model goodness fit. Let k be the number
of parameters of the model, L be the value of the likelihood and n the number of observations. The two
criteria are defined as
AIC = 2k − 2 ln (L) BIC = k · ln (n) − 2 ln (L)
The lower the criteria, the better, that is, AIC and BIC penalizes models that have too many parameters.
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In addition, since weather conditions may have a considerable effect on supply of fresh
produce, I include weather-related variables when computing the forecasts. First, I ran a
principal component analysis of the weather variables described in Section 2 using poly-
nomials, lags and interactions. In the ARMA-GARCH model, I included the five most
important factors that represent together more than 98% of the variation of those variables
for each good.
Finally, from the estimation of the ARMA-GARCH model, I computed daily forecasts for
the mean and variance of the series for each auction, from the day it was scheduled to the
duration of the contract (adjusted for the number of business days). Therefore, for each
auction, the forecasts Et
[
Zjt′
∣∣ It] and Vt [Zjt′∣∣ It] are different, unless the auctions were
scheduled on the same day and had the same contract length. From those daily forecasts,
I am using the mean of the predictions. The forecasts were calculated dynamically, that is,
using only the information that was available on the day of the auction and not the whole
series.
The estimated forecasts were noticeably good, when compared to the actual series. Table
4 presents the correlations between the actual wholesale prices series and the forecasts
Et
[
Zjt′
∣∣ It] and Vt [Zjt′∣∣ It]. The forecasts for the means are very close to the actual
series, with correlation ranging from 0.85 (limes) to 0.97 (bananas). For the variance, it is
not as high, but still very close, with correlations ranging from 0.66 (ripe tomatoes) to 0.78
(limes).
1.4.2. Estimation of the risk premium
With the forecasts computed, I can investigate the effect of the expected volatility of the
prices in the winning bid. For a graphical visualization first, Figure 8 plots the mean
expected prices for the duration of the contract and winning bids for one government agency
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and four of these goods.35 The plots show that bids roughly follow the pattern of expected
prices and are usually lower than the forecasts, except for limes for which bids seem to be,
in general, higher than the expected prices.
I now turn to my main objective which is to estimate the risk premium (Equation (1.4)).
First, I estimate the coefficients from Equation (1.3) using the winning bid and the second-
lowest bidder traits. The results are summarized in Table 5. The estimated coefficient
on absolute risk aversion is 0.0174. Following Cohen and Einav (2007) to interpret this
estimate, this coefficient would mean that suppliers are indifferent between a 50-50 gamble
of gaining US$100 and losing US$15.36 This implies a very high level of risk aversion.
Dillon and Scandizzo (1978) study small Brazilian farmers and estimated their coefficient
on absolute risk aversion from experimental data. They find coefficients in the 0.0016-0.0034
range, which is lower than what I find. However, they suggest some interviewer biases that
Binswanger (1980) tries to overcome in a very influential paper. Binswanger (1980) finds
that the estimated risk aversion in rural India ranges from 0.32 to 1.74. This implies a
even higher degree of risk aversion than what I estimate, which could be understandable
since farmers are likely more risk averse than intermediaries. Finally, Love and Buccola
(1991) estimate risk and technology choice jointly for Iowa corn farmers with CARA utility
functions and find a range 0.016 - 0.14 for the coefficient, which is very close to my findings.
Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that farmers in developing countries are found to be
more risk averse than their counterparts in developed economies due to less access to risk-
management instruments (Young (1979)). Brazil is known for being a country that has
very bureaucratic regulations and bad law enforcement. Out of 189 economies, Brazil is
ranked 120 in ease of doing business according to a World Bank report.37 Therefore, it is
not surprising to find that Brazilian firms are more risk averse when compared to other
35The agency is the Prof Ataliba Nogueira Penitentiary in Campinas. It is the agency that has bought
these goods most often: 118 auctions in total for bananas, limes, oranges and green tomatoes. However, it
did not commission any auction to buy ripe tomatoes.
36This number is found by solving for x such that u (w) = 1
2
u (w + 100) + 1
2
u (w − x).
37http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/brazil
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countries, since they are less shielded against adverse conditions.
Furthermore, as Rabin (2000) identifies, the comparison between risk preferences across
different contexts and stakes can be very problematic. In the case of Cohen and Einav
(2007), the mean individual with CARA utility function would pay US$ 76.51 for the same
gamble. However, the context of their study is auto insurance in which the bet involves
losing the total value of the car. In my setting, suppliers may lose one contract out of others
they can sign. Hence, I believe the framework I study is closer to financial markets than
insurance markets.
Considering this interpretation, I also computed the relative risk aversion implied by the
model’s estimates. In order to do that, I multiplied the estimated coefficient of risk aversion
by the contract value, which is the winning bid multiplied by the total quantity commis-
sioned. Table 6 presents the average contract value for each good and the implied median
and mean relative risk aversion. With the exception of limes, the coefficients are many
times greater than 10, which is a usual upper bound in the financial literature. However,
when compared to the estimates found in Campbell (2003) for many developed countries,
they actually look small. In Campbell (2003), the relative risk aversion ranges from 58.11
(Australia) to 1713.19 (Sweden) in an asset pricing model.38
The remaining estimates from Table 5 are statistically significant and have the expected
sign, except for distances. The winning bid increases when the mean expected price for the
duration of the contract increases, and decreases with quantity and number of bidders.
It remains to show the implied risk premium suppliers require when bidding from Equation
(1.4). Table 7 shows statistics for the implied risk premium, computing Equation (1.4) as a
percentage of the winning bid. For bananas, limes and oranges, the cost of the risk to the
government is around 2% on average. However, for ripe tomatoes and green tomatoes, the
38I excluded the negative estimates from this range. If the correlation of stock returns and consumption
growth is constrained to be equal to 1, the estimates on relative risk aversion are smaller, ranging from 8.42
(Australia) to 49.32 (USA).
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two most volatile goods, the risk accounts for 38% and 26% on average, respectively. This
evidence shows that the procurement cost due to contract risk can be substantial.
Finally, Table 8 presents the correlation between the suppliers’ estimated fixed effects per
good. The correlations are all positive but far from perfect, which provides another reason
to include the interaction φij in the model. This means that firms’ fixed effects only would
not capture that firms might be more competitive in one good than another. The highest
correlation is not a surprise as it happens between the two types of tomatoes (0.8349).
There are two main concerns that could potentially bias the results. First, since suppliers
are risk averse, they might try to build a diverse portfolio in order to reduce risk. In this
context, portfolio diversification means that if the supplier won an auction for a risky good,
he or she might try to win another contract for which risk is negatively correlated with the
good he/she won . Since I am not taking that into consideration in my empirical analysis, if
this strategy is present it means that suppliers are more risk averse than what the estimates
suggest. Therefore, if that is the case, the estimates I find could be interpreted as a lower
bound for risk aversion. Second, it could be the case that suppliers prefer bundles rather
than single items. Many of the auctions for fresh produce happen simultaneously, so cost
synergies in the form of reduced transportation costs could play a role in suppliers’ strate-
gies.39 In this case, the risk of the bundle is unchanged, but it could be that suppliers bid
more aggressively to win more contracts. However, this effect would be partially captured
by the fixed effects φij since it affects the part of the cost that is fixed (transportation cost)
and not the part that relates to the input price (expected price and variance). Moreover,
changes in risk do not affect this preference.
39These complementarities among goods is another reason that hinder collusion in these auctions, since
each supplier has incentives to break the collusive agreement in order to be able to win in a subset of goods
rather than single items (Brusco and Lopomo (2002)).
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1.4.3. Robustness checks
The main analysis presented so far argued that there is an intrinsic risk in the contracts that
suppliers do not have much control over. This is because goods are perishable and cannot
be stored for prolonged period of times, so suppliers are very exposed to price fluctuations.
However, if there are certain types of goods that do not share these features, namely short
durability and flexible storage requirements, would the estimates change? Intuitively, they
should. Table 9 presents the same analysis done so far for five root vegetables: garlic, onions,
potatoes (regular and clean) and yuca root. For those goods, I find that suppliers are not
risk averse and therefore do not include a risk premium in their bids which is consistent
with the far lower risk associated with supplying those contracts. This is in sharp contrast
with the high risk aversion shown in the case of fruits.
Moreover, the main results presented in Table 5 and Table 7 use the winning bid and second-
lowest bidder’s traits in Equation (1.3). However, the equilibrium from the button auction
also holds true for other lower ranked bidders: each supplier’s cost is equal to the bid from
the bidder ranked above. The only supplier in which it is not possible to infer the bidder’s
true cost is the winner. Table 10 presents the results when all bidders but the winner are
included. There are 62 different suppliers (17 more than in the previous analysis) and they
are less risk averse on average when we compare the results with the second-lowest bidder
only. The same finding is present when I drop the restriction of including only suppliers
that participated in more than 30 auctions, increasing the number of suppliers from 47 to
111 (Table 11).
1.5. Counterfactual Analysis
In this section, I use the estimation results to evaluate the government procurement costs
in different schemes, most notably, schemes that reduce the contract risk for suppliers. The
counterfactual mechanism I consider introduces risk sharing between the government and
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supplier. In principle, the government could completely eliminate the risk, but that would
require knowledge of the fraction of the firms’ cost that is due to the price of the good (γj
in Equation (1.1)). However, this strategy would be impractical for many reasons: it would
require a different type of contract for each good and an econometrician to estimate the
model. Nonetheless, a simple contract in which the government is willing to take about 40%
of the risk across all goods could translate into remarkable savings in public expenditures.
Providing suppliers more insurance or reducing contract risk is not unusual. For instance,
in order to avoid contract uncertainty, US Forest Services indexes payments to timber prices
at the time of the harvest, which can take place two to six years after the auction (Haile
(2001)). I propose a different approach that introduces risk sharing between government
and suppliers. Of course, this exercise is only applicable if we assume that the government is
risk neutral or at least less risk averse than the suppliers. There are several reasons to argue
that this might be the case. First, each government agency commissions several auctions
per year, for many different goods, including other fresh produce not studied in this paper
but also other types of goods, such as office supplies, furniture and clothing. Therefore, if
there is any risk in these contracts from the agency perspective, it is much more diluted.
Second, the State government as an entity is a far larger agent in the economy than the
small suppliers that participate in the auction, and engage in much riskier projects than the
purchase of fresh produce, such as highway construction, provision of public transportation
and health care, to name a few. Finally, public employee wages are in the vast majority
fixed and there are no incentive schemes to reward performance. That means that although
the agency employee who manages the auction process has a budget to administer, his or
her wage is not attached to the outcome of the auction.
Given that the government can be assumed to be risk neutral in the contracts for fresh
produce, consider the following mechanism that changes the payment scheme to the auction
winner: the contract specifies that the government will pay a fraction θj of the wholesale
market price on the day the good is delivered and suppliers bid how much on top of that
24
fraction that they are willing to sell the good for. The cost function of the firm, given
by Equation (1.1), which I replicate below, is still the same. That is, suppliers still face
uncertainty about their own cost since they do not know the price of the good Zjt′ on the
day they are supposed to deliver it:
cijt′ = φij + β1dit + β2Xt + γjZjt′ + εijt
However, if firm i wins the auction, the revenue is different with this new contract. Let rijt′
denote the revenue on the day the good is delivered. Then,
rijt′ = θjZjt′ + lijt
where lijt is the lump sum amount on top of θZjt′ that the supplier bid on the auction day
t. Note that in this new contract the revenue is also unknown on the day of the auction.
Therefore, the realized profit per unit a firm makes will be equal to
rijt − cijt′ = lijt − φij − β1dit − β2Xt + (θj − γj)Zjt′ − εijt
Following the same steps as in Section 2, from the utility function
Uijt
((
rijt′ − cijt′
)
qjt′
)
=
−e−α((rijt′−cijt′)qjt′)
α
supplier i submits a bid lijt as long as
lijt ≥ φij + β1dit + β2Xt− (θj − γj)Et
[
Zjt′
∣∣ It]+ 1
2
α (θj − γj)2 qjt′Vt
[
Zjt′
∣∣ It]+ εijt (1.5)
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Note that if we compare Equation (1.5) to (1.2), the terms that depend on i remain the
same. That is, in this exercise, the ranking in the auction would not change with the new
payment scheme and the equilibrium would be exactly the same. Therefore, from the button
auction equilibrium, the winning bid will be the second-order statistic from the distribution
of reservation price:
l
(1)
ijt = φ
(2)
ij +β1d
(2)
it +β2Xt− (θj − γj)Et
[
Zjt′
∣∣ It]+ α
2
(θj − γj)2 qjt′Vt
[
Zjt′
∣∣ It]+ε(2)ijt (1.6)
Figures 9-13 plot the average risk premium associated with different values for θj . From
Equation (1.6), it is clear that the risk premium will be zero when θj = γj . Indeed, looking
at the estimates for γj from Table 5, the plots show that the risk premium is at its minimum
when θj is closer to those values. Figures 9-13 also included the case when θj = 0 (equivalent
to the actual contract) and, as it should, they are a perfect match with the ones computed
in Table 7.
It is worth noting that it would not be desirable for the government to apply a fraction
θj that is too high. At first, this goes in the opposite direction of common sense since a
higher θj means that the government is taking a higher share in the risk. However, a higher
θj means less uncertainty about the cost but more uncertainty about the revenue. And
because suppliers are risk averse, they do not like uncertainty, and the U-shaped curves in
Figures 9-13 then seem very intuitive.
Although it would be impractical to implement θj = γj because it would require a different
contract for each good and the estimation of the coefficients, which could make the procure-
ment process less transparent in the eyes of the public, nevertheless the government could
still apply a simple rule by choosing a uniform θ to all goods and reduce the risk premia.
From Figures 9-13, if θ = 0.4, the risk premium for each of the goods barely reaches 1%
of the winning bid. For bananas, limes and oranges, this reduces the risk premia by half
when compared to the actual contract (Table 7). For both types of tomatoes, the savings
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are quite substantial and it would mean a drop in the average risk premia from 38% and
26% to nearly zero for ripe and green tomatoes, respectively.
1.6. Conclusion and Future Work
This paper provides evidence that contract risk associated with market uncertainty can
affect the procurement cost for the government. Using a parsimonious model to assess the
cost and risk preference parameter of suppliers that bid in these type of contracts, suppliers
are shown to be highly risk averse and, as a result, there is a significant risk premium built
into their bids. However, when bidding for contracts that are far less sensitive to future
market conditions, bidders’ risk premium is vastly lower.
I propose an alternative type of contract that allows the government to share part of the
risk with suppliers and which could substantially reduce the government’s procurement
cost. If the government offers to pay 30-50% of the market price and suppliers bid how
much more they are willing to sell the good above that amount, the risk premium would be
reduced to at most 1% of the winning bid. This contract would then significantly reduce
the expenditure incurred by the government in exchange for them taking on some of the
risk.
While jump bids and post-auction bargaining are largely absent from fresh produce procure-
ment auctions, they are features in the data for other products and services sold through
auction by the Sao Paulo State government. I intend to examine both jump bidding and
post-auction bargaining in future research.
Jump bidding is a common phenomenon in English auctions that is not yet fully understood.
Because of the richness of this dataset, I am able to describe which industries are more prone
to jump bidding and when this behavior is more likely to happen during the auction. This
exercise will shed light on a common practice in real world auctions that is not captured by
standard models. Finally, for those goods in which the bargaining stage is an important part
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of the procurement process, the data includes chat transcripts of the negotiation between
suppliers and government agency, which is very rare. Moreover, because the government
may reject the offers made by the winning bidder and bargain with the second-lowest bidder,
the value of the contract depends on a bidder’s beliefs about the agency’s bargaining power
and how bargaining will eventually unfold. This limited commitment from the government
will add new insights to the empirical auctions literature.
28
1
2
3
4
5
P
ric
e 
fo
r 
to
m
at
o 
(r
ip
e)
 in
 R
$,
 d
ef
la
te
d
Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13 Jul 13 Jan 14
winning bid
Figure 1: Contract Risk Example: This figure plots the series of wholesale prices for toma-
toes (ripe) for 2012-2013. The shaded areas represent the duration of two different contracts
and the horizontal lines are the winning bids for each of these contracts. Prices are per kilo
(2.2 pounds) and showed in Brazilian currency (R$) deflated to 2005 prices using the Na-
tional Consumer Price Index (IPCA).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Wholesale prices, Winning Bid, and Contract Character-
istics: 2008-2014
Good
Wholesale
Price
Winning
Bid
Quantity
Contract
Length
# of
auctions
Banana
0.7463
(0.1367)
0.6112
(0.2882)
8,792
(5,957)
106.34
(23.03)
1,742
Lime
1.3314
(0.8345)
1.2335
(0.6659)
671 (1,038)
105.07
(22.81)
519
Orange
0.8066
(0.1521)
0.5689
(0.7309)
9,625
(7,892)
106.14
(24.25)
1,023
Tomato (ripe)
1.7130
(0.6552)
0.8264
(0.4482)
4,186
(2,068)
107.96
(21.03)
1,053
Tomato (green)
1.7170
(0.6564)
0.8564
(0.4600)
5,923
(3,139)
106.76
(22.79)
1,652
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for wholesale prices, winning bids and contract characteristics
for the five most common produce goods that were purchased using electronic procurement auctions during
2008-2014. Table entries are sample means and standard deviations (in parentheses). The unit of analysis
for average wholesale prices, winning bids and quantity is per kilo (2.2 pounds). Average contract length
is in days. Prices are in Brazilian currency (R$) and deflated to 2005 prices using the National Consumer
Price Index (IPCA). Sample includes auctions that had at least two suppliers.
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Prices Received By Farmers, Wholesale Prices and Winning
Bid: 2008-2014
Good Farmers’ Prices Winning Bid Wholesale
Banana 0.45 0.61 0.74
Tomato Industry 0.14
0.84 1.71
Consumers 0.95
Orange Industry 0.16
0.56 0.80
Consumers 0.22
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for the prices received by farmers, wholesale prices and win-
ning bids during 2008-2014. Farmers’ prices were collected from the Agricultural Economics Institute in
the State of Sao Paulo and are sample means from the monthly average prices available. Winning bids and
wholesale market prices for tomatoes are sample means from the entries in Table 1 for ripe and green toma-
toes. The unit of analysis is per kilo (2.2 pounds). Prices are in Brazilian currency (R$) and deflated to
2005 prices using the National Consumer Price Index (IPCA).
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Orange 
Tomato (ripe) 
Figure 2: Goods that Cannot be Accepted Example: This figure shows the pictures of
poor-quality oranges and ripe tomatoes that should not be accepted by government agen-
cies. Those pictures are provided to government agency staff from Ceagesp (Program Hor-
tiescolha) as part of their training to help agencies get high-quality goods. All pictures can
be easily accessed from the Hortiescolha website.
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Figure 3: Banana Wholesale Prices Volatility: 2005-2014. The figure on top plots the
complete series of wholesale prices for bananas. Prices are per kilo (2.2 pounds) and showed
in Brazilian currency (R$) deflated to 2005 prices using the National Consumer Price Index
(IPCA). The orange line is a cubic spline fit for better visualization of the main changes of
the series. The bottom figure plots the daily percentual change in prices.
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Figure 4: Lime Wholesale Prices Volatility: 2005-2014. The figure on top plots the complete
series of wholesale prices for limes. Prices are per kilo (2.2 pounds) and showed in Brazilian
currency (R$) deflated to 2005 prices using the National Consumer Price Index (IPCA).
The solid line is a cubic spline fit for better visualization of the main changes of the series.
The bottom figure plots the daily percentual change in prices.
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Figure 5: Orange Wholesale Prices Volatility: 2005-2014. The figure on top plots the
complete series of wholesale prices for oranges. Prices are per kilo (2.2 pounds) and showed
in Brazilian currency (R$) deflated to 2005 prices using the National Consumer Price Index
(IPCA). The solid line is a cubic spline fit for better visualization of the main changes of
the series. The bottom figure plots the daily percentual change in prices.
34
1
2
3
4
5
P
ric
e 
in
 R
$,
 d
ef
la
te
d
Jan 05 Dec 05 Dec 06 Dec 07 Dec 08 Dec 09 Dec 10 Nov 11 Nov 12 Nov 13 Nov 14
Wholesale prices Cubic spline
Tomato (green)
−
1
−
.5
0
.5
%
 C
ha
ng
e
Jan 05 Dec 05 Dec 06 Dec 07 Dec 08 Dec 09 Dec 10 Nov 11 Nov 12 Nov 13 Nov 14
% Change in Prices
Figure 6: Tomato (green) Wholesale Prices Volatility: 2005-2014. The figure on top plots
the complete series of wholesale prices for green tomatoes. Prices are per kilo (2.2 pounds)
and showed in Brazilian currency (R$) deflated to 2005 prices using the National Consumer
Price Index (IPCA). The solid line is a cubic spline fit for better visualization of the main
changes of the series. The bottom figure plots the daily percentual change in prices.
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Figure 7: Tomato (ripe) Wholesale Prices Volatility: 2005-2014. The figure on top plots
the complete series of wholesale prices for ripe tomatoes. Prices are per kilo (2.2 pounds)
and showed in Brazilian currency (R$) deflated to 2005 prices using the National Consumer
Price Index (IPCA). The solid line is a cubic spline fit for better visualization of the main
changes of the series. The bottom figure plots the daily percentual change in prices.
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Table 3: ARMA-GARCH Models for the Wholesale Prices Series
Good ARMA(p, q) Trend
Banana (11,0) yes
Lime (13,2) yes
Orange (24,2) no
Tomato (ripe) (18,2) yes
Tomato (green) (20,1) yes
Note: This table presents the best ARMA model fit for each of the goods using the complete wholesale price
series (2005-2014). The models were chosen using the Akaike and Schwarz information criteria.
Table 4: Correlation Between Forecasts and Actual Series
Good corr
(
Zjt′ ,Et
[
Zjt′
∣∣ It]) corr(Zjt′ , Vt [Zjt′∣∣ It])
Banana 0.9775 0.7816
Lime 0.8552 0.7835
Orange 0.9211 0.7727
Tomato (ripe) 0.9144 0.6684
Tomato (green) 0.8791 0.7089
Note: This table presents the correlation between the actual wholesale price series and the forecasts for the
mean and variance from the ARMA-GARCH model for each good. I computed the forecasts for each day
of the length of the contract, starting at the day the auction took place and then calculated the mean for
that period. The forecasts were computed dynamically and only considered information up until the day of
the auction, that is, it did not include the complete series. To compute the variance of the series, I used a
15-day window.
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Figure 8: Mean Expected Prices and Bids: 2008-2014. This figure plots mean expected
prices for the duration of the contract and winning bids for auctions commissioned by Prof
Ataliba Nogueira Penitentiary in Campinas for bananas, limes, oranges and green tomatoes.
The expected prices were computed using ARMA-GARCH model with the series of past
prices and weather information. From the daily forecasts for each day of the contract length,
the figure shows the mean value. Prices are per kilo (2.2 pounds) and showed in Brazilian
currency (R$) deflated to 2005 prices using the National Consumer Price Index (IPCA).
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Table 5: Estimated Risk Aversion - Fruits
Coefficient Standard error
Risk aversion 0.0174*** 0.0037
Banana Et [Zjt′ | It] 0.6678*** 0.0943
Quantity -9.09e-06*** 1.48e-06
# of bidders -0.0633*** 0.0079
Lime Et [Zjt′ | It] 0.2811*** 0.0305
Quantity -0.00006*** 0.00001
# of bidders -0.16379*** 0.0205
Orange Et [Zjt′ | It] 0.3382*** 0.1145
Quantity -6.85e-06*** 1.64e-06
# of bidders -0.0745*** 0.01278
Tomato (ripe) Et [Zjt′ | It] 0.4586*** 0.0379
Quantity -0.00008*** 0.00001
# of bidders -0.0718*** 0.0144
Tomato (green) Et [Zjt′ | It] 0.3581*** 0.0230
Quantity -0.00005*** 6.01e-06
# of bidders -0.0631*** 0.0108
Distance -9.87e-08** 4.198e-08
N 5,983
Adj R2 0.1380
Note: This table presents the estimate on coefficient of absolute risk aversion when suppliers have CARA
utility and their costs are normally distributed. The dependent variable is the winning bid. The mean ex-
pected variance is multiplying the total quantity commissioned. All variables were demeaned by suppliers-
goods’ average to account for fixed effects. Winning bids and quantity unit is per kilo (2.2 pounds). Distance
is from the agency to the second-lowest bidder location to represent the button auction equilibrium and it
is showed in meters (3.28 feet). Significance levels 5%, and 1% are denoted by **, and ***, respectively.
Table 6: Contract Value and Implied Coefficient on Relative Risk Aversion
Contract Value Relative Risk Aversion
Mean Std Dev Median Mean
Banana 4984.76 3,904.45 71.59 86.93
Lime 787.48 1507.38 6.23 13.73
Orange 4720.34 4223.28 66.05 82.32
Tomato (ripe) 3329.20 2381.27 49.86 58.06
Tomato (green) 4780.11 3439.04 70.64 83.36
Note: This table presents the mean and standard deviation of contract values for each good and the implied
median and mean of relative risk aversion. The contract value is computed by multiplying the winning bid
by the the total quantity commissioned in the contract. The relative risk aversion is computed by multiply-
ing the estimate on the absolute risk aversion by the contract value.
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Table 7: Implied Risk Premium: Percentage of Winning Bid
Banana Lime Orange Tomato (ripe) Tomato (green)
25th percentile 1.0 0.2 0.6 21.3 13.6
Median 2.1 0.6 2.2 38.3 26.5
Mean 2.5 2.4 3.1 39.9 26.8
75th percentile 3.4 1.7 4.1 55.5 36.8
Note: This table presents statistics for the implied risk premium for each good. It is computed as the per-
centage of the winning bid attributed to the mean expected variance.
Table 8: Bidder-Good Estimated Fixed Effects Correlation
Banana Lime Orange Tomato (ripe) Tomato (green)
Banana 1
Lime 0.6409 1
Orange 0.7461 0.5873 1
Tomato (ripe) 0.5653 0.2186 0.3089 1
Tomato (green) 0.5244 0.2890 0.2351 0.8349 1
Note: This table presents the correlations between suppliers’ estimated fixed effects per good from the non
linear regression.
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Table 9: Estimated Risk Aversion - Root Vegetables
Coefficient Standard error
Risk aversion 3.11e-09 5.14e-09
Garlic Et [Zjt′ | It] 0.7845*** 0.0162
Quantity -0.0001*** 0.00002
# of bidders -0.2545*** 0.0193
Onion Et [Zjt′ | It] 0.7892*** 0.1096
Quantity -6.70e-06 5.51e-06
# of bidders -0.0590*** 0.0164
Potato Et [Zjt′ | It] 0.5110* 0.2820
Quantity -0.00001* 6.18e-06
# of bidders -0.0442 0.0309
Potato (washed) Et [Zjt′ | It] 0.6425** 0.2645
Quantity -4.96e-06 4.29e-06
# of bidders -0.0649* 0.0252
Yuca Et [Zjt′ | It] 0.0981 0.3714
Quantity -0.00001 0.00001
# of bidders -0.0945 0.0407
Distance 5.94e-07*** 9.23e-08
N 4,026
Adj R2 0.4113
Note: This table presents the estimate on coefficient of absolute risk aversion when suppliers have CARA
utility and their costs are normally distributed. The dependent variable is the winning bid. The mean ex-
pected variance is multiplying the total quantity commissioned. All variables were demeaned by suppliers-
goods’ average to account for fixed effects. Winning bids and quantity unit is per kilo (2.2 pounds). Distance
is from the agency to the second-lowest bidder location to represent the button auction equilibrium and it is
showed in meters (3.28 feet). Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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Table 10: Estimated Risk Aversion: All Suppliers Except Winners
Coefficient Standard error
Risk aversion 0.0076*** 0.0014
Banana Et [Zjt′ | It] 0.6781*** 0.0588
Quantity -6.03e-06*** 8.81e-07
# of bidders -0.0241*** 0.0046
Lime Et [Zjt′ | It] 0.4213*** 0.0274
Quantity -0.00006*** 9.99e-06
# of bidders -0.1115*** 0.0119
Orange Et [Zjt′ | It] 0.2552*** 0.0755
Quantity -3.80e-06*** 8.77e-07
# of bidders -0.0745*** 0.01278
Tomato (ripe) Et [Zjt′ | It] 0.5466*** 0.0301
Quantity -0.00004*** 7.10e-06
# of bidders -0.0409*** 0.0075
Tomato (green) Et [Zjt′ | It] 0.3705*** 0.0162
Quantity -0.00003*** 3.29e-06
# of bidders -0.0309*** 0.0069
Distance 3.33e-08 2.88e-08
N 11,457
Adj R2 0.1245
Note: This table presents the estimate on coefficient of absolute risk aversion when suppliers have CARA
utility and their costs are normally distributed. The dependent variable is the bid from the bidder ranked
one position above. This results follow the button auction equilibrium and includes all bidders except the
winner, for which it is not possible to recover the cost. The mean expected variance is multiplying the total
quantity commissioned. All variables were demeaned by suppliers-goods’ average to account for fixed effects.
Bids and quantity unit is per kilo (2.2 pounds). Distance is showed in meters (3.28 feet). Significance levels
5%, and 1% are denoted by **, and ***, respectively.
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Table 11: Estimated Risk Aversion: All suppliers
Coefficient Standard error
Risk aversion 0.0124*** 0.0026
Banana Et [Zjt′ | It] 0.6542*** 0.0941
Quantity -8.40e-06*** 1.37e-06
# of bidders -0.0643*** 0.0075
Lime Et [Zjt′ | It] 0.3298*** 0.0324
Quantity -0.00007*** 0.00001
# of bidders -0.1726*** 0.0196
Orange Et [Zjt′ | It] 0.3550*** 0.1099
Quantity -6.16e-06*** 1.47e-07
# of bidders -0.0759*** 0.0121
Tomato (ripe) Et [Zjt′ | It] 0.4974*** 0.0383
Quantity -0.00007*** 0.00001
# of bidders -0.0745*** 0.0137
Tomato (green) Et [Zjt′ | It] 0.3787*** 0.0222
Quantity -0.00004*** 5.43e-06
# of bidders -0.0626*** 0.0104
Distance -9.25e-08* 4.11e-08
N 6,553
Adj R2 0.1415
Note: This table presents the estimate on coefficient of absolute risk aversion when suppliers have CARA
utility and their costs are normally distributed. The dependent variable is the bid from the bidder ranked
one position above. This results follow the button auction equilibrium and includes all bidders except the
winner, for which it is not possible to recover the cost. The mean expected variance is multiplying the total
quantity commissioned. All variables were demeaned by suppliers-goods’ average to account for fixed effects.
Bids and quantity unit is per kilo (2.2 pounds). Distance is showed in meters (3.28 feet). Significance levels
10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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Figure 9: Risk Premium for Different Fractions of Risk Sharing: Banana. This figure plots
the average risk premium associated with different contracts in which the government offers
to pay a percentage θ of the wholesale market price. The risk premium is the percentage
of the winning bid attributed to the mean expected variance. The risk premium associated
with θ = 0 is the same as in the current contract format. For θ close to the estimated
coefficient on the mean expected price (0.66), the risk premium is at its minimum.
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Figure 10: Risk Premium for Different Fractions of Risk Sharing: Lime. This figure plots
the average risk premium associated with different contracts in which the government offers
to pay a percentage θ of the wholesale market price. The risk premium is the percentage
of the winning bid attributed to the mean expected variance. The risk premium associated
with θ = 0 is the same as in the current contract format. For θ close to the estimated
coefficient on the mean expected price (0.30), the risk premium is at its minimum.
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Figure 11: Risk Premium for Different Fractions of Risk Sharing: Orange. This figure plots
the average risk premium associated with different contracts in which the government offers
to pay a percentage θ of the wholesale market price. The risk premium is the percentage
of the winning bid attributed to the mean expected variance. The risk premium associated
with θ = 0 is the same as in the current contract format. For θ close to the estimated
coefficient on the mean expected price (0.33), the risk premium is at its minimum.
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Figure 12: Risk Premium for Different Fractions of Risk Sharing: Tomato (ripe). This
figure plots the average risk premium associated with different contracts in which the gov-
ernment offers to pay a percentage θ of the wholesale market price. The risk premium
is the percentage of the winning bid attributed to the mean expected variance. The risk
premium associated with θ = 0 is the same as in the current contract format. For θ close
to the estimated coefficient on the mean expected price (0.46), the risk premium is at its
minimum.
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Figure 13: Risk Premium for Different Fractions of Risk Sharing: Tomato (green). This
figure plots the average risk premium associated with different contracts in which the gov-
ernment offers to pay a percentage θ of the wholesale market price. The risk premium
is the percentage of the winning bid attributed to the mean expected variance. The risk
premium associated with θ = 0 is the same as in the current contract format. For θ close
to the estimated coefficient on the mean expected price (0.36), the risk premium is at its
minimum.
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CHAPTER 2 : Economic Insights From Bidding Behavior In Procurement
Auctions: Jump Bidding
2.1. Introduction
Auctions provide the ideal setting to study interactions among players because the set of
rules is clearly defined beforehand. With the recent growth of online auctions, high quality
data has become available to researchers, bringing to attention some new and interest-
ing bidding behaviors that were not anticipated in theoretical models. These real-world
observations challenge the way economists have been studying auctions and provides rich
opportunities for future research in the area.
One particular phenomenon that is very frequent in open out-cry auctions (English auctions)
is jump bidding.40 This behavior refers to the situation when a bidder places a bid that
is larger than necessary to outbid the current winning bid. Although very common in
real-world auctions, jump bidding is not yet fully understood. Intuitively, absent bidding
costs, one would expect bidders to place a sequence of small bids in hope of getting a
higher payoff if no one else places a new bid. By jump bidding, bidders raise their own
bids without waiting for a competitor’s response. Nonetheless, jump bids are very often
reported in auction data, the earliest case dating back to A.D. 193.41
The empirical relevance of jump bidding is well reported in the literature. Isaac et al. (2007)
reports that over 40% of the bids in FCC spectrum auctions were jump bids and Easley and
Tenorio (2004) provides a similar statistic for internet auctions (33% of bids were jumps). In
this paper, using a large dataset of procurement of off-the-shelf items by local government
agencies in the State of Sao Paulo in Brazil, I aim to answer two questions. First, I want to
evaluate whether the predictions of current models of jump bidding match the patterns we
40See for example McAfee and McMillan (1996), Easley and Tenorio (2004), Plott and Salmon (2004) and
Börgers and Dustmann (2005).
41See Klemperer (1999) footnotes 21 and 107, about the Roman Empire auction.
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see in the data. Second, I explore what are some of the bidders’ and auctions’ characteristics
correlated with jump bidding.
In the literature, jump bidding arises because it is used as a signal to show strength to
competitors (Avery (1998) and Daniel and Hirshleifer (1998)). The main purpose of jump
bidding is to induce other bidders to exit and thereby reduce competition. The predictions
generated by these models are the following: 1) bidders would jump as early as possible,
2) there will be less bids when there are jumps, 3) the degree of aggressiveness tends to
increase over the time of the auction, and 4) winners are the ones who place larger jumps.
However, with the exception of the first prediction, that bidders place bids early in the
auction, I will show that the patterns in the data go in the opposite direction of the other
predictions.
In order to shed light on some of the features that make jumps more likely, I explore what
characteristics of auctions and bidders determine the jump size. I find that the number of
bidders and firm size increase the size of the jump on average. More interestingly, winners
and less experienced bidders place smaller jumps. Moreover, contrary to the predictions of
the theoretical models, jump bidding is associated with more competition in the auctions,
as measured by bidding wars.
The State government runs electronic procurement auctions for a wide range of goods and
the reports of these auctions are available online. All the bids, bidders and goods are
observed and there are thousands of auctions across different industries. The richness of
this dataset provides an unprecedented opportunity to infer important insights that help us
understand better the strategic interaction among bidders in auctions. Out of more than
1.3 million bids, almost 40% of them are jump bids, meaning that the difference between
the current winning bid and the new bid is larger than the minimum increment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides institutional back-
ground on the online procurement process and introduces the data. Section 3 defines what is
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jump bidding and shows how extensive this phenomenon is in the data. Section 4 describes
the current models on jump bidding and their main predictions. It also provides evidence
of how these predictions do or do not match the patterns in the data. Section 5 provides
results on what are some of the characteristics of auctions and bidders that are important to
understanding the prevalence of jump bidding, as well as it provides correlations with this
phenomenon and some measures of competitiveness in the auctions. Section 6 concludes.
2.2. Institutional Background and Data
In this section, I describe the procurement process and the data. The data consists of
reports of the procurement auctions in the State of Sao Paulo in Brazil from 2008 to 2014
for a wide range of goods. Those reports are publicly available online.42 The State is the
most populated Brazilian State and produces almost one third of the country’s GDP, which
makes it an important local economy.43
The procurement process has three main stages. The government agency first publicly
announces the auction and describes the goods it wants to buy. If the good delivered does
not meet the requirements, the government agency may reject the delivery and require
another delivery or terminate the contract, in which case the firm is subject to penalties.
The public announcement also specifies the total quantity being commissioned, the day and
time the auction will take place, and the minimum increment between bids.
Prospective suppliers submit initial offers before the auction takes place to indicate interest
in participating in the procurement process. On the auction day, the number of interested
and qualified bidders are revealed and the second stage is the auction itself that follows a
reverse English auction protocol.44 Each supplier is given a random identifying name so
42All the reports and auction details can be found at http://www.bec.sp.gov.br (in Portuguese).
43During the period studied (2008-2014), there were two administrations with governors elected from the
same political party so there is no concern about radical political changes. There were three governors during
this period. The first one was elected and began his mandate in 2007 but renounced to run for president
and the vice-governor assumed. The third one was elected and began his mandate in 2011.
44Initial offers may not qualify in case there is any kind of information in the document submitted with
the proposal that identifies the supplier. For instance, the government provides instructions in order to hide
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identities are not known to the agency and other bidders, but all bids and identifiers are
observed. The bidding stage lasts for 15 minutes, unless there is a valid bid in the last
three minutes.45 In such cases, the bidding phase is extended for three more minutes and
continues until there are no more valid bids.46 The winner is the one who submitted the
lowest bid.47
The last stage is a bargaining phase where the auctioneer bargains with the winner of the
auction stage. The bargaining stage adds a challenge to a structural approach because
bidders have two counteracting incentives. In a structural model, jump bidding would arise
as an equilibrium strategy, that is, bidders would have incentives to bid more aggressively.48
At the same time, knowing that there will be a bargaining stage after the auction generates
incentives for bidders to shade their bids in order to enter the bargaining phase with a
stronger position.
Table 12 provides basic counts of the auctions from 2008 to 2014 that had between two
and six bidders.49 There were 127,800 auctions, commissioned by 771 different government
agencies that bought 6,233 different type of goods.50 More than 6,000 different bidders
participated in these auctions.
Table 13 reports summary statistics on the distribution of the number of bidders per auc-
tion in the data, on the number of bids per auction, and on the duration of the auction.
Firms do not know in advance the number of bidders when deciding to participate in the
the firm name from Microsoft Office and Acrobat Reader products.
45A valid bid is any bid that is lower than the supplier’s last bid and satisfies the minimum difference
between bids required in the public announcement.
46This is a similar mechanism as the automatic extension used in Amazon auctions in Roth et al. (2002).
47There is one exception to this rule. In case a firm is classified as a small firm (depending on gross
revenue) and its bid is very close to the winning bid (usually no more than 5% higher), this firm is given
preference. For an analysis of preference programs in procurement auctions, see Krasnokutskaya and Seim
(2011). The setting I am studying is slightly different from theirs though, since the supplier must be able
to contract at least at the price the lowest bidder submitted and entry costs are negligible.
48In a related paper (Konichi-Paulo (2015)), I study a particular set of goods for which jump bidding was
not prevalent and the bargaining stage did not play an important role in the outcome of the auction.
49More than 99% of the auctions in the data had at most six bidders.
50I am including goods that had at least 10 auctions.
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procurement process. In the data, slightly over half of the auctions have two bidders com-
peting in the procurement process. Even with such small number of participants, there
is a relatively high number of bids, averaging almost four bids per participant in the case
of two bidders. Furthermore, the average length of time between the start of the auction
and the last bid (duration) is around 14 minutes. Moreover, as the number of participants
increases, the average number of bids during the auction increases, and the increase is close
to linear. At any considered number of participants the average number of bids per bidder is
approximately four. At the same time, the average duration of the auction stage increases
less than linearly with the number of participants, indicating that competitors react, on
average, at faster rate in auctions with many participants. All of those findings point in
the direction that even though the number of bidders is relatively small in most auctions,
there is active participation which indicates competitive behavior.
Table 13 also reports summary statistics on the percentage savings obtained by government
agencies during the bargaining stage, on the money left on the table by the auction winner
(difference to second lowest bid), and on the decline of the price offers during the procure-
ment process. As it is possible to see in the table, the fraction of successful procurement
processes increases from less than 96% to around 99% as the number of participants in the
auction increases from two to six. The savings variable is defined as
savings =
winning bid− final (contract) price
winning bid
In most of the auctions (66%), the savings is exactly equal to zero, which means that the
contract price was the same as the winning bid. In those cases, the government was not
able to reduce the price any further. Because of that, the average savings in Table 13 are
very low. For reference, Figure 14 plots the frequency distribution of savings when it is
greater than zero.
During an auction, the winner might outbid the second best offer to the government agency
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by too much, the difference is usually called ”money left on the table”. As the number of
bidders increase, there is a considerable fall in the money left on the table from around 10%
with two bidders to around 2% with six bidders. Moreover, as the number of participants
increase, there is much higher variation among offers during the procurement process. With
two bidders, the price falls on average 30% between the first bid and the winning bid (before
bargaining), and with six bidders there is a fall in the price of 62% on average. Those
three findings suggests that the active participation by bidders in the data is coupled with
relevant competition in terms of prices, in particular where there is a relatively high number
of participants.
Table 14 summarizes bidders characteristics in the data across different firm sizes. Slightly
more than one-half of bidders in the data are small firms, but big firms participated on
average in around 63 auctions whereas small firms participated on average in 47 auctions.
Moreover, bigger firms win more often. However, firms across different sizes have also some
similar characteristics. They participate in auctions of 14 different goods on average, that
were commissioned by around 8 or 9 different government agencies on average. As already
highlighted in Table 13, participants place on average around four bids during an auction,
with no relevant heterogeneity in this dimension according to firm size.
Lastly, Table 15 reports summary statistics with respect to the buyers, that is, the different
government agencies that commissioned an auction during 2008 to 2014. The table divides
the samples in two main regions, the Sao Paulo City Metropolitan Area and the the other
regions in the State. The regions were defined by the mesoregions of the State in which
the agency is located.51 However, many government agencies have subsidiaries all over the
State and in many cases it was not possible to identify exactly which one was buying the
goods. For instance, the State Department of Health has many agencies across the State
and it was not always clear which one was buying supplies. In those cases, the region was
defined as where the headquarters of the agency is, which was always in the Sao Paulo
51https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of mesoregions of S%C3%A3o Paulo (state)
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City. Therefore, although it is the most populated region of the State, the Metro Area
might be over-represented as the majority of agencies and auctions commissioned are from
that region. Table 15 shows that the agencies in the Metro area commissioned on average
190 auctions for more than 65 different goods during the period of analysis. Besides that,
the remaining statistics are similar across regions with respect to the average number of
bidders, bids and the percentage of auctions that resulted in trade.
In summary, the dataset is comprehensive in various dimensions. It has a considerable cov-
erage across different goods, firms and government agencies commissioning the procurement
process. Moreover, the data indicates active competition by different participants during
each auction and increases in competition as the number of participants increase, resulting
in higher savings for the state government.
2.3. Jump bidding in the data
This section defines jump bidding and describes it in the data. In the procurement auctions,
in order for a new bid to be valid, it has to be lower than the last bid placed by the same
bidder by a certain predetermined amount.52 I denote this amount to be the minimum
decrease requirement. A jump bid is any bid that is larger than the minimum decrease
required.
The minimum decreased is defined in the public announcement but is not part of the auction
reports. Denote by k > 0 be the minimum decrease observed from all bids from a given
auction and let b be the current minimum bid and b is a new bid placed. Define jump size
as
j =
b− b
k
− 1 (2.1)
52In the case of the first bid, it has to be lower than the initial offer proposed by the bidder when indicating
interest to participate in the auction.
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If the new bid b is a straightforward bid, meaning that it is exactly equal to the current
winning bid b minus the minimum required k, then j = 0.53 If instead the new b is such
that b− b > k, then j > 0. For instance, j = 1 means that the new bid was lower than the
current winning bid by two times the minimum requirement. Note that if the true minimum
decrease requirement is k? and k? ≤ k, the observed minimum requirement, then
j + 1 =
b− b
k
≤ b− b
k?
= j? + 1⇒ j ≤ j?
which means that the measure of jump from Equation (2.1) is a lower bound of the true
jump.
Except for the first bid placed in a given auction, I computed j for all the bids. To be
conservative and in order to avoid extreme jumps that may arise due to typos in the bids, I
focus on auctions that had jumps between the 10th and 90th percentile of the distribution
of jumps.54 Out of more than 1.3 mi bids (excluding first bids), almost 40% of them were
jumps and 77% of the auctions had at least one jump.
Figure 15 plots the distribution of jumps according to their size and conditional on j > 0.
Most of the jumps are concentrated below j < 5. Indeed, Figure 16 plots the frequency
distribution for j ≤ 4 that comprises 75% of all the jumps. The most striking feature
of Figure 16 are the spikes on round numbers. Those spikes suggest that bidders are
deliberately choosing the size of the jump and that the observed minimum decrease is very
close to the true one.
Moreover, the government defines the minimum decrease in advance and it could be the
case that if the minimum decrease is too low when compared to the value of the good, we
would observe more and larger jumps. For instance, if the minimum decrease was set at R$
0.01 and the good being commissioned is valued at R$ 100, the minimum requirement would
53Daniel and Hirshleifer (1998) refer to straightforward bidding as the ratchet solution. Both terms mean
the same: when bidders decrease their bid by the minimum amount required.
54Conditional on j > 0, the 10th percentile means j ≥ 0.25 and the 90th percentile means j ≤ 19.
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not be an important decision variable and a R$ 1 decrease between bids would represent a
jump of size 100.55 Figure 17 plots the contract price against the minimum bid in log scale
and the relationship is positive, that is, if the good is more expensive the minimum bid
requirement is larger. Hence, the minimum requirement does follow the value of the goods
being auctioned.56
Table 16 provides summary statistics on the average number of jumps, the distribution of
the jump size, with and without straightforward bidding (when j = 0), and the money left
on table as compared to the minimum requirement. The first column reports the average
number of jumps, that is, the number of bids for which j > 0. The number of jumps
increases as the number of bidders increase, suggesting a positive correlation of the number
of jumps with the degree of competitiveness in the auction. With respect to the average
jump size, there is a relatively big increase in the jump size from two to three bidders (from
1.05 to 1.64) when all the bids are included. After three bidders, the average jump size
remains relatively constant. The average jump size conditional on j > 0 ranges from 3 to
3.5 on average across different number of bidders, meaning that jumps are on average 3
times the size of the minimum requirement. Finally, the last column on Table 16 reports
the absolute value of the difference between the winning bid and the second lowest bid
relative to the minimum requirement. In other words, it provides the average jump size of
the last bid. Across different numbers of bidders, the winning bid is on average two times
the minimum requirement lower than the second lowest bid.
Tables 17 and 18 reports similar statistics when considering the bidders (small firms and
big firms) and buyers (Sao Paulo Metro Area and other regions), respectively. The tables
include statistics for the unconditional average jump size, average jump size conditional on
j > 0, the winner’s average jump size, and the average number of bids. Bigger firms bid
55This is another reason to restrict attention to auctions that had jumps between the 10th and the 90th
percentile of the distribution.
56Bapna et al. (2003) finds that the choice of the minimum requirement is an important variable for the
auctioneer’s revenue.
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slightly more aggressively than smaller firms as well as firms who are competing in auctions
commissioned by government agencies outside the Metro Area.
In summary, jump bidding is a widespread phenomenon that spans across many different
goods, firm sizes and government agencies. The next section briefly describes models in the
literature that could explain this type of bidding pattern and provides evidence of how well
the implications of these models match the data.
2.4. Jump bidding as a signal
The current models that explain jump bidding argue that this type of bidding strategy
occurs as a way to signal strength, that is, to signal low costs in procurement auctions.
This Section provides evidence as to whether or not jump bidding is used as a signaling
device.
Avery (1998) and Daniel and Hirshleifer (1998) provide models in which jump bidding arise
in equilibrium.57 Bidders jump as way to communicate with other bidders that they have
a high valuation and prefer to jump bid as early as possible hoping that the signal given
through the jump will refrain other bidders from continuing to bid.
In particular, Avery (1998)’s model is a two stage game with affiliated values. In the first
stage, bidders have the opportunity to bid either a straightforward bid or a jump bid and
they choose simultaneously. Following the opening bids, the second stage is a standard
English auction. Avery (1998) shows that the main advantage of placing a jump bid as an
opening bid is that it discourages competitors from bidding. The equilibrium strategy is
based on a cutoff value such that a bidder uses a jump bid if its valuation is above such
cutoff. In the case the openings bids are unmatched, that is, one bidder jumps and the other
57Easley and Tenorio (2004) and Hörner and Sahuguet (2007) are two other references. Easley and Tenorio
(2004) studies a model very similar to Daniel and Hirshleifer (1998) but introduces demand uncertainty,
which is very common to internet auctions when the number of bidders is unknown, like eBay for instance,
in which bidders do not know if a potential competitor might find the auction and bid. Hörner and Sahuguet
(2007) studies a two-round auction in which in the first stage one of the bidders has the opportunity to make
an opening bid that can be matched by its competitor. If matched, the second stage is a sealed bid auction.
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does not, the latter correctly infers that the bidder who jumped has a higher valuation and
thus decides to exit the auction.
Daniel and Hirshleifer (1998)’s model departs from the assumption that it is costly to submit
or revise a bid. This is the main driving force that creates incentives for bidders to jump
bid. Bidding costs in the Sao Paulo procurement auctions can be considered negligible and
similar to a live auction: there might be fixed costs to participate, but there is no cost to
place a new bid once a bidder is already in the auction. Nonetheless, Easley and Tenorio
(2004) points out that bidders in online auctions face costs such as the internet connection
cost and the opportunity cost to log in and prepare the bid. However, the Sao Paulo
procurement auctions last on average less than 20 minutes while many internet auctions
last for days.58
In the model of Daniel and Hirshleifer (1998), a jump bid is also used to intimidate a
competitor, as it serves to two purposes: by deterring a competitor from further bidding,
it allows the bidder to buy the good at a lower price but it also reduces the expected bid
costs. However, if the competitor is not intimidated, there will be a sequence of higher
jumps because bidding is costly, and bidders want to avoid placing many bids.
In summary, the models proposed by Avery (1998) and Daniel and Hirshleifer (1998) provide
two predictions, namely:
1. Jump bidding is intended to discourage competitors from continuing to bid and thus
results in a smaller number of bids.
2. If the competitor does not exit, bids will be more aggressive
In both models, jumps work as a signaling device that aims to deter or refrain competition.
Let us show how well this predictions match the patterns we observe in the data.
58Isaac et al. (2007) and Kwasnica and Katok (2007) offer an alternative explanation for jump bidding
using the cost of opportunity. Assuming that time is a valuable resource, bidders are impatient and use
jump bidding so the auction would end as soon as possible.
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With respect to the first prediction, Table 19 shows that jumps might not be working as
a good signaling device. We would expect on average a smaller number of bids if a jump
is used as a signal to refrain other bidders from bidding. However, Table 19 shows that
auctions with no jumps had on average fewer bids than auctions with jumps, conditional on
the number of bidders. Table 19 also includes the average number of bids for auctions that
had only one jump. In that case, the relationship is not clear and varies with the number
of bidders. In order to inspect this evidence further, Figure 18 plots the average number
of bids per good for auctions without jumps (y-axis) and with jumps (x-axis). Each dot
represents a different good and the 45o degree line indicates that most of the goods had more
bids on average when there was at least one jump in the auction. Indeed, when controlling
for good fixed effects, Table 20 shows that the average difference in the number of bids
between auctions with and without jumps is 5.9 bids.
However, the bid order of the first jump seems to matter. Table 21 reports the regression
estimates of the number of bids after the first jump when it was the second, third, ..., and
sixth bid in the auction. Although the coefficients are not always significant, the estimates
indicate that a jump placed earlier has a greater impact. The evidence in Table 21 suggests
that when the first jump is the second bid placed in an auction (more than 50% of the first
jumps are the second bid in the auction, as I will discuss it later), the number of bids after
the jump increase by 5.8 bids on average, a similar estimate as in Table 20. However, when
the first jump is the third bid placed in the auction, then the number of bids after the jump
decrease, which could be evidence of signaling. As discussed in the next section, the models
proposed by Avery (1998) and Daniel and Hirshleifer (1998) assume that jumps are placed
early in the auction to act as a signal. Table 21 shows that depending on the bid order of
the first jump, the evidence is mixed.
The negative relationship between the number of bids and jumps is counterintuitive. If
jump bids discourage bidding, we would expect to see fewer bids when compared to the
case in which bids decrease by the minimum bid requirement. If two auctions have the
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same number of bids, but one has jumps and the other does not, then the auction that had
jumps necessarily has a lower price. Indeed, that is what Table 22 reports. Auctions that
had jumps had a higher difference between the first bid and winning bid than auctions with
no jumps, across all number of bidders. This fact remains true for auctions that had only
one jump, with the exception of the case where the number of bidders is two.
The second prediction, present in Daniel and Hirshleifer (1998), says that jumps will be
followed by even more aggressive jumps in order to signal non-negligible information. I
observe the opposite pattern in the Sao Paulo procurement auctions. Figure 19 plots the
average jump size per minute for different number of bidders. In all cases, the average jump
size decreases as time passes during the auction.59 Similarly, Figure 20 plots the average
jump size considering the order in which the bid was placed during the auction. Irrespective
of the measure, the jump size decreases considerably.
Avery (1998) and Daniel and Hirshleifer (1998) model jumps happening in the early stage
of the auction in order to signal to other bidders that their valuation for the good being
auctioned is high. Although this is not a result but a feature of the model, it matches
the patterns we see in the data, as the first jump in an auction occurs most often among
the first 10 bids, half of them being the second bid in the auction as shown by Table 23.
Yet, Figure 21 plots the average number of jumps per auction duration decile. It shows
that jumps indeed occur more frequently during the period between deciles two and three,
although not right at the beginning when we consider the auction duration. Daniel and
Hirshleifer (1998)’s model also implies that bidders may decide to delay their first bid in
order to observe and learn what the other bidders are doing. The intuition is that, because
bidding is costly, a bidder who is uncertain about the likelihood of winning will wait to see
their competitors’ bids.
59Although the decreasing pattern is evident, there are two spikes in the average jump size when there
are six bidders close to 80 minutes. It worth noting that there are very few auctions with six bidders that
last that long.
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Finally, if jumps are used as signals for low costs then winners should place on average
more aggressive bids. As shown by Table 17 however, bidders place on average smaller
jumps. Table 24 provides the average jump size per ranking in the auction and number of
bidders. When compared to the bidder who ranked second, the winner places higher jumps
on average. However, from the third to the sixth ranking, the average jump size is higher
than the bidders ranked in first and second. In the next section, controlling for auction
and goods characteristics, there is further evidence that winners are the ones who bid less
aggressively.
There is a concern that the association between jump and the number of bids could be
due to unobserved product heterogeneity that is not captured by the fixed effect estimates.
Intuitively, if there is a lot of uncertainty about the competitors’ costs, there are more
opportunities to jump and signal that a bidder has low cost. Therefore, if auctions are
repeated and there is some regularity in the bidders who participate in auctions for the
same products, the value of jumping is reduced because they are likely to know each others’
costs. In order to address this issue, I ran a regression for the number of bids on the number
of bidders and a dummy variable that indicates if there was at least one jump in that auction
for all goods separately. Because of the immense number of different goods, I am unable
to report all of those regression but Figure 22 plots the distribution of the coefficients.
Figure 22 plots all the coefficients although only 16% of these goods have coefficients that
are statistically significant at 5%, since the number of observations is relatively small for
many goods which reduces the statistical power of the test for a significant share of goods.
Nonetheless, from Figure 22 we can see that there is indeed a lot of heterogeneity but more
than 89% of the goods have a positive coefficient, reinforcing that the signal hypothesis
does not hold for this auctions. Moreover, Figure 23 replicates Figure 18 but includes only
goods that had more than 100 auctions (an average of 16 auctions per year). If the high
frequency of auctions reduces the uncertainty, the value of the jump as a signal is reduced
and most of the these frequently bought goods still have more bids when there were jumps.
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Therefore, the two theories that explain jump bidding provide predictions that do not match
the observed bidding pattern in the data. The main assumption is that jumps are used to
scare competitors and reduce the competition. As McAfee and McMillan (1996) and Isaac
et al. (2007) also find, there is little evidence that jump bids deter competitors. On the
contrary, the evidence suggests that jump bidding is correlated with more competition in
the auctions.
2.5. Some Intriguing Properties
This section presents a series of regressions that explore what are some of the traits of
bidders and auctions that correlate with jump bidding.
Table 25 shows the results of the effect of the number of bidders on the average jump
size in a given auction. The dependent variable in the first two columns is the average
aggressiveness as measured by the jump size including straightforward bidding (when the
difference between bids is the minimum decrease required). From Table 25, an additional
bidder increases the jump size by 0.24 on average. The dependent variable in the last two
columns is the average jump size excluding straightforward bidding, that is, conditional
on j > 0. Therefore, an additional bidder increases the average aggressiveness by 0.06
conditional on on the auction having at least one jump. Note however that, as suggested by
Table 16, the main driving force comes from an additional third bidder. If the number of
bidders is a measure of the degree of competition in an auction, I find that as the competition
increases, bidders bid more aggressively on average.
More interestingly, Table 26 does a similar exercise by computing the average jump size per
bidder in a given auction. When I include bidders’ fixed effects (column 2), Table 26 shows
that an additional bidder increases the jump size by 0.15 on average. The other specifications
in Table 26 differ depending on whether the dependent variable includes straightforward
bidding or not and the presence of bidders’ fixed effects. Across all specifications, as firms
gain more experience in those auctions, they on average make higher jumps. Moreover,
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larger firms, as defined by their gross revenue and number of employees, are more likely to
jump bid and the auction winner is the bidder who places smaller jumps.
The finding that the winner is the bidder who places smaller jumps on average provides
additional evidence that jump bidding is not being used as a signal of strength. In fact,
similar to Hörner and Sahuguet (2007), the results indicate that bidders do not follow a
monotonic strategy since the intermediate types are the ones who are the most aggressive
in the initial bids. Among the last bids placed in a auction, only one third of them were
jumps.
It remains to look at how the jumps ultimately affect the outcome of the procurement
process, that is, how the jumps affect the contract price considering the bargaining stage
that occurs after the auction. The bargaining stage creates incentives for bidders to shade
their true costs in order to enter the bargaining with more room to negotiate. Since the
first to bargain with the government agency is the auction winner, and those are the ones
who place smaller jumps on average, it might be the case that those bidders who expect to
bargain with the government are bidding less aggressively.
Table 27 shows the results of the effect of the winner’s average jump size on the variable
savings, defined in Section 2 as the difference between the winning bid and final price after
the bargaining stage, normalized by the winning bid. The regression only includes cases
in which trade occurs, that is, if the government accepted a price. Table 27 shows that
a unit increase in the winner’s average jump size indeed increases the difference between
the winning bid and contract price by 2%, that is, if the winner places larger jumps the
government agency does better in the bargaining stage. If instead of the winner’s average
jump size we use the auction average jump size, a similar result is found as showed in
Table 28. Alternatively, when we take into account the number of jumps (in contrast with
the average size), the estimates have a different sign and magnitude: one additional jump
decreases the difference between the winning bid and contract price. This contrasting result
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suggests that the number and size of jumps might have a non-linear effect in the bargaining
outcome.
The difference between the winning bid and final price is truncated at zero, in which case
the contract price is equal to the winning bid. In fact, the government is unable to reduce
the winning bid further in more than two thirds of the auctions. To take that into account,
Table 29 presents the result of the effects of the different measures of aggressiveness in the
auction in the final outcome of the procurement process (savings). The results show that
for an unit increase in either the winner’s average jump size or the auction’s average jump
size, there is a 5% increase in the price difference. The number of jumps, on the other hand,
decreases the price difference by 1.2%.
In the bargaining stage, the government agency can decide not to buy the good if it considers
the price too high and schedule another auction. The percentage of auctions that do result in
trade is high, on average more than 95% of the transactions. Nevertheless, it is interesting to
look at how the likelihood of trade is correlated with the aggressiveness during the auction.
Table 30 shows the results of different logit regressions when the dependent variable is a
categorical variable that is equal to one when there was trade. When controlling for a
dummy variable that says whether there was a jump or not, Table 30 shows that it does
not have an effect on the likelihood of trade. However, the average jump size and number
of jumps have a negative effect. Although these results do not include important factors
that may affect the bargaining stage, such as bargaining power and expectations, they are
intriguing.
Not only does jump bidding not deter competitors from further bidding, it has an effect
on the price fall (the variable ∆price) as shown in Table 31. Controlling for the number of
bidders an good fixed effects, Table 31 shows that a jump increased by 16% on average the
difference between the first and winning bid. Therefore, a jump does not substitute several
small bids by one bid only, it is associated with a better outcome for the auctioneer.
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Therefore, in summary jump bidding is associated with more competition, more experienced
bidders and larger firms. Moreover, lower ranked bidders bid more aggressively than bidders
who are ranked first or second.
2.6. Conclusion
Jump bidding is a behavior commonly observed in auction data. Models that explain
and allow jump bidding to arise in equilibrium depart from the idea that jump bids are
used to communicate to competitors about a bidder’s strength. Using a large dataset of
procurement auctions in Brazil that spans across many different industries, I found that
the predictions of these models are not consistent with the patterns in the data.
I explore some of the characteristics of auctions and bidders that could possibly explain
jump bidding. I found that an additional bidder increases the average jump size and that
larger firms are more likely to jump. However, winners place smaller jumps on average
which contradicts the idea of using jumps as a signaling strategy. On the other hand, more
experienced bidders tend to place higher jumps.
As Hörner and Sahuguet (2007) suggest, jump bidding might not be monotonic in the
valuation. The results suggest that experience and learning might be important factors
in explaining this phenomenon. Another possibility could be that bidders face a certain
degree of impatience as in Isaac et al. (2007), which could play an important role as bidders
can use jumps to quickly get to the relevant price range. A structural model that explains
these findings could help shed light on this behavior that is not yet well understood in the
literature.
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Table 12: Procurement Auctions: 2008-2014
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total
# of Auctions 8,641 17,432 17,671 20,088 22,398 20,904 20,666 127,800
# of Distinct Goods 1,928 3,156 3,638 4,170 4,459 4,421 4,239 6,233
# of Distinct Buyers 321 387 397 390 403 426 475 771
# Distinct Sellers 1,112 1,950 2,078 2,207 2,415 2,377 2,488 6,309
Note: This table presents basic counts for auctions that had between two and six bidders (inclusive) from
2008 to 2014. The table shows the number of auctions, distinct goods that were purchased using the auc-
tions and the number of distinct buyers and sellers that participated in the procurement process. Exam-
ples of items bought for selected industries: Foodstuff (bens); Computer accessories, parts and components
(500 GB HD, 7200rpm); Weapons (0.40 handgun); Ammunition and explosives (pepper spray); Animals for
slaughter and experiments (quail); Articles for personal hygiene (white paper towel); Pharmaceutical drugs
and supplies (Meropenem trihydrate); Office stationery (A4 paper).
Table 13: Summary Statistics: Auctions
# of Bidders # of
auctions
# of
bids
Bidding
duration
Trade Savings Money
on the
table
∆price
2 67044 7.90
(0.03)
861.20
(3.56)
95.60% 0.03 (0.00) 0.10
(0.00)
0.30
(0.00)
3 39498 13.13
(0.06)
1303.71
(5.68)
96.90% 0.02 (0.00) 0.04
(0.00)
0.44
(0.00)
4 15740 17.31
(0.10)
1546.65
(9.40)
97.45% 0.01 (0.00) 0.03
(0.00)
0.52
(0.00)
5 4376 21.01
(0.20)
1676.57
(18.18)
98.22% 0.01 (0.00) 0.02
(0.00)
0.58
(0.00)
6 1142 24.35
(0.44)
1739.16
(33.03)
98.86% 0.01 (0.00) 0.02
(0.00)
0.62
(0.01)
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics about the auctions per number of bidder. The second column
reports the total number of auctions per number of bidders. The fourth column provides the percentage
of trade, that is, the percentage of procurement processes in which the government accepted a price. The
remaining table entries are simple averages and standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Bidding
duration is measured in seconds and it the difference between the time stamp of the first to the last bid.
Savings is the percentage difference between the contract price and the winning bid, with respect to the
winning bid conditional on trade. Money on the table is absolute value of the difference between the win-
ning bid and the second lowest bid, normalized by the winning bid. The variable ∆ price is the difference
between the first bid and the winning bid, normalized by the winning bid.
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Figure 14: Savings with respect to the winning bid: This Figure plots the frequency distri-
bution of savings as a percentage of the winning bid conditional on trade and on the savings
being greater than zero. In other words, it includes only the cases in which the government
was successful in reducing the price in the bargaining stage and accepted the final offer from
the supplier.
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Table 14: Summary Statistics: Bidders
Small Big
Number of Bidders 3214 3095
Avg Number of Auctions 46.59 (4.24) 62.85 (12.97)
Avg Number of Goods 14.72 (0.63) 14.31 (0.82)
Avg Number of Buyers 9.03 (0.29) 8.20 (0.30)
Avg Number of Bids 4.73 (0.10) 4.68 (0.11)
Avg Wins/Auctions 0.29 (0.00) 0.38 (0.00)
Note: This table presents basic summary statistics relative to the bidders that participated in the State of
Sao Paulo procurement auctions between 2008-2014. The table reports the statistics according to the bid-
der’s size, as defined by the government according to each firm’s gross revenue and number of employees.
With the exception of the first line that provides the absolute number of bidders, the remaining lines are sim-
ple averages and standard deviations are reported in parentheses. The average number of goods (buyers) is
the average number of distinct goods (government agencies) that bidders bid for. The average wins/auctions
is the average number of auctions that the bidder won over the total number of auctions that the bidder
participated.
Table 15: Summary Statistics: Buyers
So Paulo Metro Area Other regions
Number of buyers 633 138
Number of auctions 119,272 8,204
Avg Number of Auctions 190.52 (14.44) 52.14 (8.85)
Avg Number of Goods 65.81 (5.01) 37.84 (5.73)
Avg Number of Bidders 2.89 (0.02) 3.04 (0.06)
Avg Number of Bids 21.70 (0.58) 23.65 (1.38)
Trade 96.38% 95.83%
Note: This table presents basic summary statistics relative to the government agencies that commissioned
a procurement auction between 2008-2014. The table reports the statistics according to the agency’s loca-
tion. The first two lines provides basic counts of the number of different buyers (agencies) and the total
number of auctions. The following lines are simple averages and standard deviations are reported in paren-
theses. Finally, the last line reports the percentage of auctions in which a contract was signed, that is, the
government accepted a price proposed by one supplier.
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Figure 15: Distribution of Jump Sizes: This figure plots the frequency distribution of jump
sizes, from the 10th percentile of the distribution (j ≥ 0.25) to the 90th percentile (j ≤ 19).
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Figure 16: Distribution of Jump Sizes 0-4: This figure plots the frequency distribution of
of jump sizes, from j ≥ 0.25 to j ≤ 4. This subset comprises 75% of all the jumps. Spikes
on round numbers suggest that bidders are deliberately choosing the size of the jump. For
instance, j = 1 means that the new bid was lower than the current winning bid by two
times the minimum requirement.
71
-5
0
5
10
15
Lo
g(
C
on
tr
ac
t P
ric
e)
-5 -3 -1 1 3 5 7
Log(Minimum Bid Requirement)
Figure 17: Contract Price and Minimum Bid Requirement: This figure plots the contract
price and minimum bid requirement in log scale. It includes goods which contract price
were less than R$ 100,000 (more than 99% of the auctions) so the scale is easily seen.
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Table 16: Jump Bidding Summary Statistics: Auctions
Number of Bidders Number of
jumps
Avg jump size Avg jump
size|j > 0
Money on the
table/min req
2 2.58 (0.01) 1.05 (0.00) 3.26 (0.01) 1.89 (0.00)
3 4.77 (0.02) 1.64 (0.00) 3.52 (0.01) 2.18 (0.01)
4 6.52 (0.04) 1.61 (0.01) 3.43 (0.02) 2.17 (0.02)
5 8.02 (0.10) 1.47 (0.02) 3.27 (0.03) 2.12 (0.03)
6 9.33 (0.23) 1.32 (0.03) 3.09 (0.06) 1.92 (0.06)
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics about jump bidding in auctions per number of bidder. Table
entries are simple averages and standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Conditional on j¿0, only
auctions that had jumps from the 10th percentile of the distribution (j ≥ 0.25) to the 90th percentile (j ≤
19) are reported. The last column reports the absolute value of the difference between the winning bid and
the second lowest bid with respect to the minimum requirement. In other words, it is the average jump size
of the last bid.
Table 17: Jump Bidding Summary Statistics: Bidders
Small Big
Avg jump size 1.01 (0.02) 1.35 (0.03)
Avg jump size|j > 0 2.77 (0.05) 3.34 (0.06)
Avg jump size|winner 0.93 (0.00) 1.36 (0.00)
Avg number of jumps per auction 1.24 (0.00) 1.65 (0.00)
Note: This table reports jump bidding descriptive statistics for the bidders. The table reports the statis-
tics according to the bidder’s size, as defined by the government according to each firm’s gross revenue and
number of employees. Table entries are simple averages and standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
Table 18: Jump Bidding Summary Statistics: Buyers
So Paulo Metro Area Other regions
Avg jump size 1.04 (0.02) 1.13 (0.06)
Avg jump size|j > 0 3.00 (0.07) 3.10 (0.16)
Avg jump size|winner 1.15 (0.00) 1.13 (0.00)
Avg number of jumps per auction 3.96 (0.01) 4.41 (0.06)
Note: This table reports jump bidding descriptive statistics for the buyers. The table reports the statistics
according to the agency’s location. Table entries are simple averages and standard deviations are reported
in parentheses.
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Table 19: Number of Bids and Jumps
Number of bidders Number of
bids
Avg # of bids:
auctions with
no jumps
Avg # of bids:
auctions with
one jump
Avg # of bids:
auctions with
jumps
2 7.90
(0.03)
3.51
(0.03)
5.55
(0.06)
10.67
(0.05)
3 13.13
(0.06)
9.61
(0.17)
6.76
(0.08)
13.40
(0.06)
4 17.31
(0.10)
12.99
(0.42)
12.18
(0.30)
17.46
(0.10)
5 21.01
(0.20)
15.17
(1.00)
15.47
(0.79)
21.12
(0.20)
6 24.35
(0.44)
13.23
(1.29)
19.18
(2.92)
24.52
(0.44)
Note: This table reports statistics with respect to the number of bids. The second column (number of bids)
is the same as in Table 13 included here for reference as it reports the average number of bids in all auc-
tions. The remaining columns report the average decomposed into auctions that had no jumps (23% of the
auctions), auctions that had only one jump, and auctions that had at least with jump. Table entries are
simple averages and standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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Figure 18: Average Number of Bids Per Good in Auction With and Without Jumps: This
Figure plots the average number of bids for each good that was commissioned in auctions
with and without jumps. Each dot represents a different good and the blue line is the 45o
degree line.
Table 20: The Effect of Jump Bidding on the Number of Bids
Number of Bids
Jump 5.9471***
(0.0618)
Number of bidders 3.3355***
(0.0426)
Good fixed effects X
R-squared 0.3113
Obs 127,800
Note: This table reports regressions estimates of the effects of a jump on the number of bids, controlling
for the number of bidders. The unit of observation is an auction and the dependent variable is the total
number of bids. Jump is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if there was at least one jump in the auction.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and
***, respectively.
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Table 21: Number of Bids After First Jump
# of bids after ith bid
i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 i = 5 i = 6
Jump in the ith bid (A) 5.8934*** -2.4164*** 0.2976 -1.8035** 1.4335
(0.2047) (0.2599) (0.5528) (0.8143) (1.4021)
Number of bidders (B) 5.3387*** 3.2647*** 2.8462*** 2.4266*** 2.1423***
(0.0600) (0.0497) (0.0476) (0.0502) (0.0529)
(A)*(B) -2.1724*** 0.5168*** 0.0552 0.7352*** 0.0786
(0.0768) (0.0934) (0.1753) (0.2566) (0.4222)
Good fixed effects X X X X X
R-squared 0.2834 0.2557 0.2435 0.2344 0.2298
Obs 127,800 108,891 96,222 85,636 77,034
Note: This table reports regressions estimates of the effects on the number of bids after the first jump, con-
trolling for the number of bidders. Each column represents a different regression in which the dependent
variable is the number of jumps after the second, third, ..., and sixth bid. The variable ”Jump in the ith bid”
is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the first jump occurred in the ith bid order. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Table 22: Price Fall and Jumps
Number of bidders ∆price ∆price:
auctions with
no jumps
∆price:
auctions with
one jump
∆price:
auctions with
jumps
2 0.30 (0.00) 0.23
(0.00)
0.19
(0.00)
0.34
(0.00)
3 0.44 (0.00) 0.23
(0.00)
0.35
(0.01)
0.45
(0.00)
4 0.52 (0.00) 0.35
(0.01)
0.36
(0.01)
0.53
(0.00)
5 0.58 (0.00) 0.39
(0.04)
0.45
(0.03)
0.58
(0.00)
6 0.62 (0.01) 0.40
(0.09)
0.48
(0.07)
0.63
(0.01)
Note: This table reports statistics with respect to the difference in price bewteen the first and the winning
bid as a percentage of the winning bid. The second column (∆ price) is the same as in Table 13 included
here for reference as it reports the average ∆ price for all auctions. The remaining columns report the aver-
age decomposed into auctions that had no jumps (23% of the auctions), auctions that had only one jump,
and auctions that had at least with jump. Table entries are simple averages and standard deviations are
reported in parentheses.
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Figure 19: Average Jump Size per Minute: This figure plots the average jump size for every
minute of the auction. Each different line represents the number of bidders participating in
the auction.
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Figure 20: Average Jump Size per Bid Order: This figure plots the average jump size for
every bid. If the bid order is equal to two, it means that it was the second bid placed in
the auction.
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Table 23: Bid Order of First Jump
Bid order of first jump Freq. Percent
2 55,493 56.39
3 25,515 25.93
4 5,927 6.02
5 2,940 2.99
6 1,693 1.72
7 1,455 1.48
8 936 0.95
9 898 0.91
10 487 0.49
> 10 3,057 3.11
Note: This table presents the bid order in which the first jump was placed and its frequency in the data.
Note that the first bid is never considered a jump so the earliest a jump can happen in an auction is from
the second bid forward.
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Figure 21: Average Number of Jumps per Duration Decile: This figure plots the average
number of jumps for every decile of the duration of the auctions. It reports that jumps
occur more frequently in deciles 2 and 3.
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Table 24: Jump size according to ranking
Number of bidders/Ranking 1 2 3 4 5 6
2 1.19 (0.00) 1.14
(0.00)
3 1.23 (0.00) 1.18
(0.00)
1.54
(0.01)
4 1.16 (0.00) 1.09
(0.00)
1.53
(0.01)
1.78
(0.02)
5 1.12 (0.01) 0.92
(0.01)
1.32
(0.02)
1.78
(0.03)
1.70
(0.04)
6 0.97 (0.02) 0.92
(0.02)
1.14
(0.03)
1.49
(0.04)
1.79
(0.06)
1.70
(0.09)
Note: This table presents the average jump size per ranking and number of bidders. Table entries are simple
averages and standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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Figure 22: Distribution of Coefficients on Jump: This figure plots the distribution of the
coefficients from regressions of the number of bids on a dummy variable that indicates
whether there was at least one jump in the auction for each good.
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Figure 23: Average Number of Bids Per Good in Auction With and Without Jumps: This
Figure plots the average number of bids for each good that was commissioned in auctions
with and without jumps. Each dot represents a different good and the blue line is the 45o
degree line. This graph only includes good that had at least 100 auctions.
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Table 25: The Effect of the Number of Bidders on Average Jump Size
Average jump Average jump|j > 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# of Bidders 0.2407*** 0.2463*** 0.04530*** 0.0604***
(0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0091) (0.0101)
Contract Price 0.00004 0.00003 0.0001 0.0001
(0.00002) (0.00002) 0.0001 (0.00008)
Good fixed effects X X
R-squared 0.0170 0.1269 0.0016 0.1162
Obs 127,800 127,800 98,401 98,401
Note: This table reports OLS regressions estimates of the effects of the number of bidders on the average
jump size in an auction. Each column reports a separate regression at the auction level. The dependent
variable in columns (1) and (2) is the average aggressiveness as measured by the jump size including zeros
(when the difference between bids is the minimum decrease required). The dependent variable in the last
two columns is the average jump size excluding straightforward bidding. Contract price is normalized by
the minimum increment observed from the bids. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Sig-
nificance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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Table 26: The Effect of Firm’s and Auction’s Traits on Average Jump Size per Bidder
Avg jump size per bidder Avg jump size per bidder|j > 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# of Bidders 0.1102*** 0.1555*** -0.00560 0.0332**
(0.0049) (0.0051) (0.0106) (0.0111)
Bidder size 0.8395*** 0.4567*** 0.5005*** 0.3654***
(0.0092) (0.0265) (0.0215) (0.0578)
log(Bidder experience) 0.1037*** 0.1515*** 0.1279*** 0.2203***
(0.0021) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0099)
Contract Price 0.00007** 0.00007** 0.0001 0.0001
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00006) (0.00006)
Ranked in 2nd 0.3142*** 0.3757*** 0.1183*** 0.1968***
(0.0100) (0.0102) (0.0214) (0.0222)
Ranked in 3rd 0.6611*** 0.6609*** 0.4926*** 0.5242***
(0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0293) (0.0302)
Ranked in 4th 0.7735*** 0.6928*** 0.7028*** 0.6409***
(0.0284) (0.0277) (0.0486) (0.0491)
Ranked in 5th 0.6655*** 0.5653*** 0.6260*** 0.6247***
(0.0540) (0.0522) (0.0906) (0.1977)
Ranked in 6th 0.5576*** 0.4697*** 0.6736*** 0.6170***
(0.1200) (0.1152) (0.1969) (0.1985)
Bidder fixed effects X X
R-squared 0.0544 0.1580 0.0209 0.1138
Obs 299,456 299,456 125,279 125,279
Note: This table reports regressions estimates of the effects of firm’s and auction’s traits on the average
jump size per bidder in an auction. Each column reports a separate regression at the auction-bidder level.
The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the average aggressiveness per bidder in a given auction
as measured by the jump size including zeros (when the difference between bids is the minimum decrease
required). The dependent variable in the last two columns is the average jump size per bidder in a given
auction excluding straightforward bidding. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Bidder size
is a dummy variable that is zero if the firm is small, as defined by its gross revenue and number of employees.
Bidder experience is the number of auctions that the bidder has participated until that auction. Contract
price is normalized by the minimum requirement. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **,
and ***, respectively.
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Table 27: Winner’s Aggressiveness and Outcome of Procurement Process
Savings (1) (2)
Winner’s average jump size 0.0023*** 0.0021***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Number of bidders -0.0093*** -0.0089***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Log(contract price) 0.0012*** 0.0032***
(0.0001) (0.0002)
Good fixed effects X
R-squared 0.0133 0.1264
Obs 118,268 118,268
Note: This table reports regressions estimates of the effects of winner’s average jump size on the difference
between the winning bid and the final contract price after the bargaining stage, normalized by the winning
bid and conditional on trade. Each column reports a separate regression at the auction level and differs only
for the inclusion of goods fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance
levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Table 28: Jumps and Outcome of Procurement Process
Savings (1) (2) (3) (4)
Auction’s avg jump size 0.0023*** 0.0024***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Number of jumps -0.00008* -0.0007***
(0.00004) (0.00005)
Number of bidders -0.0093*** -0.0086*** -0.0091*** -0.0072***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Log(contract price) 0.0012*** 0.0013*** 0.0033*** 0.0034***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Good fixed effects X X
R-squared 0.0133 0.0111 0.1254 0.1249
Obs 118,268 118,268 118,268 118,268
Note: This table reports regressions estimates of the effects of auctions’s average jump size and number of
jumps on the difference between the winning bid and the final contract price after the bargaining stage,
normalized by the winning bid and conditional on trade. Each column reports a separate regression at the
auction level and differs across the inclusion of goods fixed effects and the measure of aggressiveness in the
auction. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are de-
noted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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Table 29: Jumps and Outcome of Procurement Process: Censored Regression
Savings (1) (2) (3)
Winner’s average jump size 0.0054***
(0.0003)
Auction’s avg jump size 0.0056***
(0.0004)
Number of jumps -0.0012***
(0.0001)
Number of bidders -0.0274*** -0.0278*** -0.0241***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Log(contract price) 0.0119*** 0.0119*** 0.0123***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Log likelihood -29,510 -29,575 -29,628
Pseudo R-squared 0.0495 0.0474 0.0456
Obs 118,268 118,268 118,268
Note: This table reports regressions estimates of the effects of jumps on the difference between the winning
bid and the final contract price after the bargaining stage, normalized by the winning bid and conditional
on trade. Each column reports a separate regression at the auction level and differs across the aggressive-
ness measure in the auction. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and
1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Table 30: Jumps and Likelihood of Trade: Logit
Trade (1) (2) (3)
Jump 0.0356
(0.0355)
Auction’s avg jump size -0.0716***
(0.0080)
Number of jumps -0.0048***
(0.0029)
Number of bidders 0.3070*** 0.3359*** 0.3237***
(0.0212) (0.0203) (0.0209)
Log likelihood -19887.193 -19851.143 -19886.368
Pseudo R-squared 0.0069 0.0087 0.0069
Obs 127,800 127,800 127,800
Note: This table reports regressions estimates of the log odd of trade considering different controls. Each
column reports a separate regression at the auction level and differs across the aggressiveness measure in the
auction. The dependent variable trade is a categorical variable that is equal to 1 when the government ac-
cepted a price from one bidder, either after the auction or the bargaining stage. Jump is a dummy variable
that is equal to 1 if the auction had at least one jump. The auction average jump size includes zeros, that
is, no jumps. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted
by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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Table 31: Jumps and Price Fall
∆price
Jump 0.1609***
(0.0059)
Number of bidders 0.0960***
(0.0015)
Good fixed effects X
R-squared 0.2442
Obs 127,800
Note: This table reports regressions estimates of the effects on jumps on the difference between the first and
the winning bid, normalized by the winning bid. The variable jump is a dummy variable that is equal to
one if the auction had at least one jump and zero otherwise. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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APPENDIX
Derivation of CARA expected utility with Gaussian distribution
Let X be normally distributed with mean µ and variance σ2. We want to know the expected
value of emX where m is a constant.
E
[
emX
]
=
+∞∫
−∞
emx
1√
2πσ2
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 dx
=
+∞∫
−∞
emx
1√
2πσ2
e−
(x2−2xµ+µ2)
2σ2 dx
=
+∞∫
−∞
1√
2πσ2
e−
(x2−(2µ+2σ2m)x+µ2)
2σ2 dx
Adding and subtracting
∫ +∞
−∞
1√
2πσ2
e
2σ2µm+σ4m2
2σ2 dx to the above expression, we get:
E
[
emX
]
= e
2σ2µm+σ4m2
2σ2
+∞∫
−∞
1√
2πσ2
e−
(x−(µ+σ2m))
2
2σ2 dx
= eµm+
σ2
2
m2
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